The Difficult Art of Achieving Military Change: The U.S. Navy after the Cold War

As the Cold War ended, the U.S. Navy faced an uncertain future. The U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy of the 1980s was moot as its enemy of over 40 years rapidly became irrelevant. Furthermore, the Navy’s forces consisted of platforms that were state of the art, but tailored to fight the Soviet Navy rather than handling the regional conflicts, rogue nations, civil wars, and terrorists that were emerging as the primary challenges of the new era. In other words, neither strategy nor force structure fit the strategic circumstances. This development is strikingly similar to the situation facing the Navy in 1945. As Admiral Stansfield Turner put it, “[w]hen the [Second World] War ended [...] there was no potential challenger to U.S. sea control. In essence, the U.S. Navy had too much of a monopoly to justify a continuing Sea Control mission. It was a Navy in quest of new missions.”1 Even though it can be a contentious and drawn out process, adaptation of stated strategy is relatively simple. Compared to other aspects of military change, the process of writing a strategy is inexpensive and requires few substantial changes to the organisation. The proof of the strategy pudding is in converting a novel strategy into actual organisational change. That includes change in institutional culture; force structure and acquisition; as well as shifts in the attitudes and cultures of stakeholders outside of the organisation. This chapter describes, analyses, and explains the difficulties in changing the U.S. Navy after the Cold War through changes in strategy documents, force structure and culture. It concludes that significant military change depends on a sound strategic and operational rationale, political support and support within the service’s officer corps, and circumstances that are not fleeting in nature.