了解ARM调试功能的安全性

Zhenyu Ning, Fengwei Zhang
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引用次数: 28

摘要

现在的处理器一直配备有调试功能,以方便程序分析。具体来说,ARM调试架构涉及一系列CoreSight组件和调试寄存器来辅助系统调试,并设计了一组调试认证信号来限制这些组件和寄存器的使用。同时,由于在传统调试模型中使用这些特性通常需要物理访问,因此调试特性的安全性没有得到充分的检查。然而,ARM引入了一种新的调试模型,自ARMv7以来不需要物理访问,这加剧了我们对调试特性安全性的关注。在本文中,我们对ARM调试特性进行了全面的安全分析,并总结了其安全性和漏洞含义。为了了解其影响,我们还调查了不同产品领域(即开发板、物联网设备、云服务器和移动设备)中一系列基于arm的平台。我们认为分析和调查揭示了在基于arm的平台上普遍存在的新的攻击面。为了验证我们的担忧,我们进一步制作了nail - gun攻击,该攻击可以获取敏感信息(例如AES加密密钥和指纹图像),并通过滥用调试功能从低特权模式实现高特权模式下的任意有效载荷执行。这种攻击不依赖于软件漏洞,我们的实验表明,我们调查的几乎所有平台都容易受到攻击。从ARM生态系统的不同角度讨论了潜在的缓解措施。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Understanding the Security of ARM Debugging Features
Processors nowadays are consistently equipped with debugging features to facilitate the program analysis. Specifically, the ARM debugging architecture involves a series of CoreSight components and debug registers to aid the system debugging, and a group of debug authentication signals are designed to restrict the usage of these components and registers. Meantime, the security of the debugging features is under-examined since it normally requires physical access to use these features in the traditional debugging model. However, ARM introduces a new debugging model that requires no physical access since ARMv7, which exacerbates our concern on the security of the debugging features. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive security analysis of the ARM debugging features, and summarize the security and vulnerability implications. To understand the impact of the implications, we also investigate a series of ARM-based platforms in different product domains (i.e., development boards, IoT devices, cloud servers, and mobile devices). We consider the analysis and investigation expose a new attacking surface that universally exists in ARM-based platforms. To verify our concern, we further craft Nailgun attack, which obtains sensitive information (e.g., AES encryption key and fingerprint image) and achieves arbitrary payload execution in a high-privilege mode from a low-privilege mode via misusing the debugging features. This attack does not rely on software bugs, and our experiments show that almost all the platforms we investigated are vulnerable to the attack. The potential mitigations are discussed from different perspectives in the ARM ecosystem.
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