{"title":"在谈判中冷静下来——有效吗?","authors":"Jörg Oechssler, Andreas Roider, P. Schmitz","doi":"10.1628/093245615X14307212950056","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour coolingoff period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities.","PeriodicalId":421122,"journal":{"name":"CEPR: Labour Economics (Topic)","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"61","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does it Work?\",\"authors\":\"Jörg Oechssler, Andreas Roider, P. Schmitz\",\"doi\":\"10.1628/093245615X14307212950056\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour coolingoff period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities.\",\"PeriodicalId\":421122,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"CEPR: Labour Economics (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"11 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"61\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"CEPR: Labour Economics (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1628/093245615X14307212950056\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"CEPR: Labour Economics (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1628/093245615X14307212950056","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour coolingoff period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes - emulating a high-stakes environment. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling-off significantly reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling-off. This treatment difference is particularly pronounced for subjects with lower cognitive abilities.