fpga上MAC-Keccak硬件实现的功耗分析攻击

2014 International Conference on ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs (ReConFig14) Pub Date : 2014-12-01 DOI:10.1109/ReConFig.2014.7032549

Pei Luo, Yunsi Fei, Xin Fang, A. Ding, M. Leeser, D. Kaeli

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引用次数: 15

摘要

Keccak是NIST选择的哈希函数，作为新的SHA-3标准。Keccak是基于海绵结构构建的，它提供了一个新的MAC功能，称为MAC-Keccak。这些新算法提出了关于侧信道泄漏和MAC-Keccak分析攻击的问题。目前已有针对MAC-Keccak软件实现攻击的研究，但尚未对其硬件实现进行全面的侧信道漏洞评估。在本文中，我们描述了在FPGA上实现的对MAC-Keccak第一轮θ步的攻击。我们构建了几种不同的侧信道泄漏模型，并在此基础上实现了攻击。我们的工作表明，SHA-3的非掩码硬件实现容易受到基于功率的侧信道攻击。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Power analysis attack on hardware implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs

Keccak is the hash function selected by NIST as the new SHA-3 standard. Keccak is built on Sponge construction and it provides a new MAC function called MAC-Keccak. These new algorithms have raised questions with regards to side-channel leakage and analysis attacks of MAC-Keccak. So far there exists prior work on attacks of software implementations of MAC-Keccak, but there has been no comprehensive side-channel vulnerability assessment of its hardware implementation. In this paper we describe an attack on the θ step of the first round of MAC-Keccak implemented on an FPGA. We construct several different side-channel leakage models and implement attacks based on them. Our work shows that an unmasked hardware implementation of SHA-3 is vulnerable to power-based side-channel attacks.

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2014 International Conference on ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs (ReConFig14)

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