应对与工作绩效的关系

L. Tummers
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引用次数: 60

摘要

在公共服务第一线的工作人员,如教师和社会工作者,不能为他们所有的客户提供无限的支持,因为时间和金钱都是稀缺的。为了解决这个问题,他们使用各种应对策略。我们分析了这种“街头官僚”可以使用的一个重要应对策略:优先考虑有动力的客户,而不是没有动力的客户。我们研究了这种应对策略对工作绩效的影响,以及他们的主管对他们的评价。换句话说,那些特别帮助有动机的客户的基层官僚的工作绩效评分是低还是高?通过研究这种关系,我们可以测试前线工作中的两种叙事:国家代理叙事与公民代理叙事。如果监管机构遵循国家代理的说法,他们会给那些优先考虑积极客户的基层官僚更低的绩效评级。主管可以强调合法性和平等的价值观:员工应该遵守政府的规定,平等对待所有客户。与此相反,如果监管者遵循公民代理的叙事,他们会给那些特别帮助有动机的客户的基层官僚更高的绩效评级。积极的客户是“值得的客户”,值得投资。“推动”没有动力的客户也可能是对稀缺资源的一种非常低效的使用。通过对美国一家机构的社会工作者进行多源研究,我们发现主管会给那些优先考虑有动机的客户的基层官僚更高的工作绩效评级。这一发现的意义和未来的研究议程显示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Relationship between Coping and Job Performance
Workers on the frontline of public service, such as teachers and social workers, cannot provide unlimited support to all their clients, because of among else scarce time and money. To deal with this, they use various coping strategies. We analyze one important coping strategy such “street-level bureaucrats” can use: prioritizing motivated clients over unmotivated clients. We study the effect of this coping strategy on job performance, as rated by their supervisors. In other words, do street-level bureaucrats who especially help motivated clients get lower or higher job performance ratings? By studying this relationship, we can test two narratives in frontline work: the state-agent narrative versus the citizen-agent narrative. If supervisors follow a state-agent narrative, they would give street-level bureaucrats that prioritize motivated clients lower performance ratings. Supervisors could stress values like legality and equality: workers should follow governmental rules and should treat all clients equally. Contrary to this, if supervisors follow a citizen-agent narrative, they would give street-level bureaucrats who especially help motivated clients higher performance ratings. Motivated clients are the “deserving clients,” worthy of investment. “Pushing” unmotivated clients may also be a very inefficient use of scarce resources. Using a multi-source study of social workers in one organization in the United States, we show that supervisors give higher job performance ratings to street-level bureaucrats who prioritize motivated clients. Implications of this finding and a future research agenda are shown.
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