{"title":"基于联盟博弈的云联盟形成机制","authors":"Lena Mashayekhy, Daniel Grosu","doi":"10.1109/UCC.2012.19","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We model the cloud federation formation problem using concepts from coalitional game theory by considering the cooperation of the cloud providers in providing the requested VM instances. We design a mechanism that enables the cloud providers to dynamically form a cloud federation maximizing their profit. Furthermore, the mechanism guarantees that the cloud federation structure is stable, that is, the cloud providers do not have incentives to break away from the current federation and join some other federation.","PeriodicalId":122639,"journal":{"name":"2012 IEEE Fifth International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"35","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Coalitional Game-Based Mechanism for Forming Cloud Federations\",\"authors\":\"Lena Mashayekhy, Daniel Grosu\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/UCC.2012.19\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We model the cloud federation formation problem using concepts from coalitional game theory by considering the cooperation of the cloud providers in providing the requested VM instances. We design a mechanism that enables the cloud providers to dynamically form a cloud federation maximizing their profit. Furthermore, the mechanism guarantees that the cloud federation structure is stable, that is, the cloud providers do not have incentives to break away from the current federation and join some other federation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":122639,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2012 IEEE Fifth International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing\",\"volume\":\"19 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-11-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"35\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2012 IEEE Fifth International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/UCC.2012.19\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2012 IEEE Fifth International Conference on Utility and Cloud Computing","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/UCC.2012.19","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Coalitional Game-Based Mechanism for Forming Cloud Federations
We model the cloud federation formation problem using concepts from coalitional game theory by considering the cooperation of the cloud providers in providing the requested VM instances. We design a mechanism that enables the cloud providers to dynamically form a cloud federation maximizing their profit. Furthermore, the mechanism guarantees that the cloud federation structure is stable, that is, the cloud providers do not have incentives to break away from the current federation and join some other federation.
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