哈代多年生植物

Gerard Caprio, Jr., P. Honohan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在系统性银行危机的漫长历史中——包括但不限于全球金融危机——最糟糕的情况是由所谓的不良银行和不良政策造成的,或者至少是严重加剧的:这些政策允许或鼓励过度冒险,甚至“掠夺”别人的钱。每次危机发生时,不可避免地都会有人齐声呼吁加强官方审慎监管,以防止危机再次发生。经验证据表明,政策的最佳方向是确保一种动态的监管方法,重点关注向市场参与者披露的信息、对银行家行为的市场纪律程度以及金融体系中的激励措施,包括对监管者的激励措施。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Hardy Perennials
In the long history of systemic banking crises—including, but not limited to, the Global Financial Crisis—the worst cases have been caused or at least severely exacerbated by what may be called bad banking and bad policies: those that permitted or encouraged excessive risk-taking and even “looting” of other people’s money. With each crisis there is an inevitable chorus of calls for more official prudential regulation and supervision to prevent a recurrence. Empirical evidence suggests that policy is best directed toward ensuring a dynamic approach to regulation focusing on the information that is being disclosed to market participants, the degree of market discipline on the behavior of bankers, and the incentives in the financial system, including those for regulators.
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