美国通货膨胀兴衰的金融根源

I. Drechsler, Alexi Savov, P. Schnabl
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引用次数: 13

摘要

我们提出并检验了大通货膨胀的兴衰的新解释,这是宏观经济学中的一个决定性事件。我们认为,它的上升是由于被称为“Q条例”的法律强制规定了具有约束力的存款利率上限,而它的下降是由于一旦该法被废除,这些上限就被取消了。存款是当时主要的储蓄形式,因此Q法规抑制了储蓄的回报。这推高了总需求,从而推高了通胀,进一步降低了储蓄的实际回报率,引发了通胀螺旋。Q条例的废除打破了这一恶性循环,导致存款利率大幅上升。我们证明,大通货膨胀的兴衰与Q条例的实施和废除以及它所产生的存款利率和数量的巨大变化密切相关。我们使用当地存款市场和通货膨胀的详细数据在横截面中进一步检验了这一解释。通过利用四种不同的地理差异来源,我们发现Q法规的约束程度对当地通货膨胀有很大影响,这与Q法规解释观察到的总通货膨胀变化的假设一致。我们的结论是,在存在金融摩擦的情况下,美联储可能无法控制通胀,无论其政策规则如何。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Financial Origins of the Rise and Fall of American Inflation
We propose and test a new explanation for the rise and fall of the Great Inflation, a defining event in macroeconomics. We argue that its rise was due to the imposition of binding deposit rate ceilings under the law known as Regulation Q, and that its fall was due to the removal of these ceilings once the law was repealed. Deposits were the dominant form of saving at the time, hence Regulation Q suppressed the return to saving. This drove up aggregate demand, which pushed up inflation and further lowered the real return to saving, setting off an inflation spiral. The repeal of Regulation Q broke the spiral by sending deposit rates sharply higher. We document that the rise and fall of the Great Inflation lines up closely with the imposition and repeal of Regulation Q and the enormous changes in deposit rates and quantities it produced. We further test this explanation in the cross section using detailed data on local deposit markets and inflation. By exploiting four different sources of geographic variation, we show that the degree to which Regulation Q was binding has a large impact on local inflation, consistent with the hypothesis that Regulation Q explains the observed variation in aggregate inflation. We conclude that in the presence of financial frictions the Fed may be unable to control inflation regardless of its policy rule.
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