Translating circuit behavior manifestations of hardware Trojans using model checkers into run-time Trojan detection monitors

It is a consensus among the researchers, although not proven, that it is close to impossible to guarantee completely secure hardware design. Therefore, it is desired to have run-time hardware Trojan detection techniques. This paper is toward developing a framework of how to achieve run-time hardware Trojan detection units. Although it is difficult to predict the stage of circuit design at which hardware intruder would insert Trojan as well as the hardware Trojan detection methodology that should be applied, behavior patterns of certain design units in the hardware can indicate malicious activities in the design. We propose to translate such behavior patterns using formal verification approaches to establish run-time hardware Trojan detection technique leading which can improve the resiliency of hardware designs against hardware Trojan. We examine the possibility of malicious intrusions in both combinational and sequential circuits that may result in functional incorrectness, and applied our methodology in two example circuits.