中国河流边界污染控制努力:搭便车何时停止?

Matthew E. Kahn, Pei Li, Daxuan Zhao
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引用次数: 10

摘要

在政治边界上,地方领导人往往缺乏减少污染活动的动力,因为社会成本是由下游邻国承担的。本文利用了在中国设置的一个自然实验,在该实验中,中央政府改变了地方政治晋升标准,从而激励地方官员按照特定标准减少边境污染。使用差异中的差异方法,我们根据河流边界的目标标准记录污染进展的证据。其他未被中央政府列为目标的水质指标在体制转变后并没有改善。利用主要工业水污染企业的经济地理数据,我们探讨了可能的机制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Pollution Control Effort at China&Apos;S River Borders: When Does Free Riding Cease?
At political boundaries, local leaders often have weak incentives to reduce polluting activity because the social costs are borne by downstream neighbors. This paper exploits a natural experiment set in China in which the central government changed the local political promotion criteria and hence incentivized local officials to reduce border pollution along specific criteria. Using a difference in difference approach, we document evidence of pollution progress with respect to targeted criteria at river boundaries. Other indicators of water quality, not targeted by the central government, do not improve after the regime shift. Using data on the economic geography of key industrial water polluters, we explore possible mechanisms.
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