为什么“专利抵抗”的激励措施会威胁到FRAND的解体,为什么这很重要

R. Epstein, Kayvan B. Noroozi
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引用次数: 13

摘要

越来越多的法官、立法者和学者,特别是在美国,错误地认为标准必要专利应以“公平、合理和非歧视的条款”(“FRAND”)许可的承诺主要是为了促进技术实施者的利益而制定的,并且在解释FRAND时往往优先考虑实施者的利益。这一前提导致美国法院对向侵犯有效标准必要专利的实施者颁发禁令持断然敌视的态度,担心禁令救济会给创新者带来不应有的杠杆作用。事实上,美国法院已经如此单方面地关注创新者的行为,以至于有些法院甚至允许实施者仅仅因为提出了后来被认为“过高”的开放许可报价而起诉创新者,即使实施者根本拒绝提出任何还价。以实施者为中心的FRAND观点也导致一些法院得出结论,认为创新者无权分享其技术标准化所产生的任何商业利益,所有这些利益都必须归实施者所有。本文认为以实现者为中心的关于FRAND起源和目的的观点是错误的。FRAND是一项合同协议,反映了利益和义务的自愿互惠交换,其驱动因素是面对高昂的交易成本,需要解决重大的协调问题。作为交易的一部分,创新者同意向标准开发组织披露他们最新的机密发现,并放弃他们对这些发现的最终专利的禁制权,以换取合同保护,防止实施者“专利抵制”。然后,这些实施者被允许使用标准必要专利,条件是他们同意为此用途支付公平和适当的版税,版税数额将通过相互诚信谈判确定。因此,本文强调,FRAND不是,也不应该被解释为,从创新者到实施者的片面转移。更确切地说,实施者也有责任真诚地协商FRAND许可——这是许多法院忽视和执行不足的责任。本文证明了实现者的诚信义务是基本FRAND架构的关键组成部分,并且这些义务的执行对于创新驱动标准的持续发展是严格必要的。本文进一步观察到,FRAND交易不仅仅是为了给创新者提供一种将其知识产权货币化的方法。更重要的是,FRAND创造了一个协商一致的谈判框架,使实现者能够接触到创新者原本保密的发现——最近的发明,否则它们不会在专利或公开申请中披露。通过这种方式,FRAND为Kenneth Arrow的信息悖论的迭代提供了一个解决方案,使标准开发工作产生商业利益,如果没有创新者的自愿参与,这将不存在。换句话说,创新者同意让实现者使用他们最具开创性的技术,并给予公平的许可,因为创新者相信,实现者随后也会善意地同意获得许可,使用那些极具价值的创新。本文从理论上和经验上都表明,法院未能认识到FRAND协议的这些方面,再加上它们对责任规则(即禁令损害赔偿)的过度依赖,导致了FRAND试图避免的专利拒绝问题。这种“有效侵权”的结果反过来又促使创新者减少参与FRAND交易,威胁到一个巨大的创新商业化市场及其对各方的无数积极外部性。为了扭转这些危害,本文建议法院在发现实施者侵犯了其未善意许可的有效专利时自动发布禁令。本文还建议,适当的FRAND许可费率应包括通过相关创新标准化所获得的部分收益。更广泛地说,这篇文章表明,法院、政策制定者和学术评论员错误地倾向于实施而不是创新——“事物”而不是想法——不明智地阻碍了“想法经济”的出现,这种经济应该正确地将大量利润分配给上游创新者,而不是分配给专门将这些创新转化为有形产品的低利润制造公司。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Why Incentives for 'Patent Holdout' Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It Matters
An increasing number of judges, legislators, and scholars, particularly in the United States, have wrongly come to believe that the commitment that standard-essential patents be licensed on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms” (“FRAND”) was principally created to advance the interests of technology implementers, and have too often given a preference toward implementers’ interests in interpreting FRAND. That premise has led American courts to take a categorically hostile view toward awarding injunctions against implementers who infringe valid standard-essential patents, fearing that the injunctive remedy would give innovators undue leverage. Indeed, American courts have been so unilaterally concerned with innovators’ conduct that some have even allowed implementers to sue innovators simply for making an opening licensing offer that is later deemed “too high,” even if the implementer refused to make any counteroffer at all. An implementer–centric view of FRAND has also caused several courts to conclude that innovators are not entitled to any share of the commercial benefits arising from the standardization of their technologies, and that all such benefits must go to implementers alone. This Article argues that an implementer–centric view of FRAND’s origins and purposes is false. FRAND is a contractual agreement that reflects a voluntary reciprocal exchange of benefits and obligations driven by the need to solve significant coordination problems in the face of otherwise prohibitive transaction costs. As part of that bargain, innovators agree to disclose their latest, confidential discoveries to standard–development organizations and to waive their injunction rights as to eventual patents on those discoveries, in exchange for contractual protection against “patent holdout” by implementers. Those implementers are then permitted to use standard–essential patents on the condition that they agree to pay fair and adequate royalties for that use, with the royalty amount to be set through mutual good faith negotiations. Accordingly, this Article stresses that FRAND is not intended to be, and should not be interpreted as, a one-sided transfer from innovators to implementers. Rather, implementers too owe a significant duty to negotiate FRAND licenses in good faith—a duty that many courts have overlooked and underenforced. This Article demonstrates that implementers’ good faith obligations are a critical component of the basic FRAND architecture and that enforcement of those obligations is strictly necessary to the continued development of innovation–driven standards. This Article further observes that the FRAND bargain is not simply meant to give innovators a way to monetize their intellectual property. Rather, and perhaps more significantly, FRAND creates an agreed bargaining framework that allows implementers to access innovators’ otherwise confidential discoveries—inventions so recent that they are not otherwise disclosed in patents or published applications. In this way, FRAND supplies a solution to an iteration of Kenneth Arrow’s paradox of information, enabling the standards development effort to yield commercial benefits that would not exist absent innovators’ voluntary participation. Stated otherwise, innovators agree to give implementers access—and a fair license—to their most groundbreaking technologies because innovators believe that implementers will reciprocally later agree to take a license in good faith for using those highly valuable innovations. This Article shows both theoretically and empirically that courts’ failure to appreciate these aspects of the FRAND bargain, combined with their overreliance on liability rules (i.e., damages over injunctions) incentivizes the very patent holdout problem FRAND was intended to avoid. That “efficient infringement” outcome, in turn, has motivated innovators to reduce their participation in FRAND bargains, threatening to unravel a massive innovation–commercialization marketplace and its innumerable positive externalities for all parties. To reverse these harms, this Article recommends that courts automatically issue an injunction where an implementer is found to infringe valid FRAND–committed patents that it did not attempt to license in good faith. This Article also recommends that a proper FRAND licensing rate should include some portion of the benefits achieved through standardization of the innovations in question. More broadly, this Article suggests that courts, policymakers, and academic commentators have wrongly favored implementation over innovation—“things” over ideas—unwisely frustrating the emergence of an “ideas economy” that should rightly assign significant profits to upstream innovators and not to the low–margin manufacturing firms that specialize in turning those innovations into tangible products.
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