Dysfunctions in Semi-Presidentialism after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine: Analysis of the Intra-Executive Conflict between President and Prime Minister

The amendments in the Ukrainian constitution in the aftermath of the Orange revolution brought about sweeping changes in the semi-presidential system. It formally strengthened the parliamentary role in the political process, particularly in cabinet appointments and dismissal. Although the transition to democracy in Ukraine had been anticipated, the semi-presidential system that was introduced after the Orange Revolution proved to be a failure. Scholars have paid attention to the institutional design and patronalism, which is defined as a social equilibrium in which individuals organize their political and economic pursuits primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments, besides the electoral system that emerged after the Orange Revolution. In particular, they have argued that the president had an initiative to form the cabinet in a multi-party system. However, this led to an intensification of the intra-executive competition between the president and the prime-minister after the formation of the cabinet. How did the semi-presidential system, introduced after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, fail? Although presidential commitment is an important component to consider when trying to understand the reason for institutional dysfunction, the interaction between the president and the prime minister is not clear. Focusing on the intra-executive competition, this article attempts to outline the process of failure of the semi-presidential system following the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. First, this article analyzes the wording of the constitutional amendments,