反向拍卖和通用电信服务:全球经验的教训

S. Wallsten
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引用次数: 28

摘要

美国现在在普及服务项目上花费了大约70亿美元——补贴旨在确保整个国家都能获得电信服务。这笔钱的大部分用于支持高成本(主要是农村)地区的电信服务,而且高成本基金正在迅速增长。为了应对这种增长,政策制定者正在考虑使用反向拍卖,或对最低补贴进行投标,作为减少支出的一种方式。虽然美国尚未通过反向拍卖的方式为全民服务项目分配资金,但这种方式已被广泛使用。首先,反向拍卖类似于标准的政府采购程序,要求企业竞标政府合同以压低价格。在简单和复杂的政府合同中,发送合同进行投标都是很常见的。其次,世界上许多国家都使用反向拍卖来分配通用基金。本文回顾了反向拍卖的全球经验,并讨论了它们对美国的影响。我特别回顾了澳大利亚、智利、哥伦比亚、印度、尼泊尔和秘鲁的反向拍卖。并非所有的拍卖都是成功的,但它们清楚地表明,反向拍卖可以是一种有效的工具,可以揭示有关提供全民覆盖的真实成本的信息,并减少补贴支出。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Reverse Auctions and Universal Telecommunications Service: Lessons from Global Experience
The United States now spends around $7 billion on universal service programs-subsidies intended to ensure that the entire country has access to telecommunications services. Most of this money supports telecommunications service in high cost (primarily rural) areas, and the High Cost fund is growing quickly. In response to this growth, policymakers are considering using reverse auctions, or bids for the minimum subsidy, as a way to reduce expenditures. While the U.S. has not yet distributed funds for universal service programs using reverse auctions, the method has been used widely. First, reverse auctions are akin to standard government procurement procedures, which call for firms to bid on government contracts to keep prices down. Sending contracts out for bid is common in both simple and complex government contracting. Second, many countries around the world have used reverse auctions for distributing universal funds. This paper reviews global experiences with reverse auctions and discusses their implications for the U.S. In particular, I review reverse auctions in Australia, Chile, Colombia, India, Nepal, and Peru. Not all of the auctions were successful, but they clearly demonstrate that reverse auctions can be an effective tool for revealing information about the true cost of providing universal coverage and for reducing expenditures on subsidies.
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