{"title":"收入、财政错觉和中间选民","authors":"Daniel Klerman","doi":"10.1628/093245616X14743741664872","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Schweizer (2017) provides a powerful and general way of using compensation payments to induce efficient actions. Its application to takings under fiscal illusion, however, is problematic. A better model would assume that the government decides to take property by considering effects on the median voter. Under that assumption, payments based on the market value of land, assuming non-excessive investment, induce efficient action by both landowners and the government.","PeriodicalId":222637,"journal":{"name":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","volume":"156 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Takings, Fiscal Illusion, and the Median Voter\",\"authors\":\"Daniel Klerman\",\"doi\":\"10.1628/093245616X14743741664872\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Schweizer (2017) provides a powerful and general way of using compensation payments to induce efficient actions. Its application to takings under fiscal illusion, however, is problematic. A better model would assume that the government decides to take property by considering effects on the median voter. Under that assumption, payments based on the market value of land, assuming non-excessive investment, induce efficient action by both landowners and the government.\",\"PeriodicalId\":222637,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"156 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2016-08-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1628/093245616X14743741664872\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"University of Southern California Center for Law & Social Science (CLASS) Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1628/093245616X14743741664872","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Schweizer (2017) provides a powerful and general way of using compensation payments to induce efficient actions. Its application to takings under fiscal illusion, however, is problematic. A better model would assume that the government decides to take property by considering effects on the median voter. Under that assumption, payments based on the market value of land, assuming non-excessive investment, induce efficient action by both landowners and the government.
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