金钱激励与不道德行为的传染

Benoît Le Maux, David Masclet, Sarah Necker
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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们从理论和经验两方面分析了金钱激励和他人行为信息是如何影响不诚实的。我们对560名参与者进行了一个实验室实验,每个人观察一个从1到6的数字,每个数字都有一个回报。他们可以如实报告所看到的数字,也可以谎报以增加收益。我们改变了回报的大小(低、高和非常高)和关于他人不诚实的信息量(有信息和没有信息)。我们首先发现不诚实落在非常高的待遇。其次,虽然社会信息平均最多只能产生微弱的积极影响,但如果考虑到个人信念的准确性,就会产生强烈的影响。第三,社会信息与收益之间不存在互动关系。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Monetary Incentives and the Contagion of Unethical Behavior
We analyze both theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others’ behavior affect dishonesty. We run a laboratory experiment with 560 participants, each of whom observes a number from one to six with there being a payoff associated with each number. They can either truthfully report the number they see or lie about it in order to increase their payoff. We vary both the size of the payoff (Low, High, and Very High) and the amount of information about others’ dishonesty (With and Without Information). We first find that dishonesty falls in the Very High treatment. Second, while social information has on average at most a weak positive effect, there is a strong effect if the accuracy of individuals’ beliefs is accounted for. Third, social information and payoffs do not interact with each other.
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