工资谈判中的性别差异:最后通牒博弈实验

Serkan Dilek, R. Yildirim
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引用次数: 1

摘要

工资方面的性别差距被认为是一个主要的经济和社会问题,它可能是由个人的行为引起的。与其他经合组织国家相比,土耳其妇女的劳动力参与率相当低,这也是一个重要问题。女性确实可能在谈判中接受较低的工资。然而,认为女性可能会接受较低的报价可能会影响雇主的报价。雇主的这种态度可能会导致工资的性别差距和女性劳动力参与率低。我们通过最后通牒博弈来探讨讨价还价过程中的行为性别差异。利他主义、风险厌恶、慷慨和自信对偏好和工资谈判的结果有显著影响。最后通牒博弈是理解利他主义、风险厌恶和慷慨的有效工具。我们在这项研究中发现了两个重要的结果。第一个;当提议者知道对方的性别时,他/她对女性的提议比对男性的提议要低。后者;在知道对方性别的情况下,女性的出价高于男性。这些结果提供了证据,证明劳动力市场中的性别收入不平等可能是由于雇主的态度(尤其是男性雇主)。这些结果实际上可以解释土耳其女性劳动力参与率低的原因,但需要对此进行更详细的研究。这项研究有助于文献作为少数研究之一,考察雇主与男性和女性工人在土耳其的工资谈判。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Gender Differences in Wage Negotiations: An Ultimatum Game Experiment
The gender gap in wages that is accepted as a major economic and social issue, can arise from the behaviours of individuals. The fact that the labor force participation rate of women in Turkey is quite low compared to other OECD countries is also an important problem. Women really may accept lower wages in negotiations. However, perceptions that women may accept lower offers may affect offers made by employers. This attitude of employers may cause a gender gap in wages and a low female labor force participation rate. We explore the behavioural gender differences during bargaining by using the ultimatum game. Altruism, risk aversion, generosity, and self-confidence have a significant impact on preferences and so the results of wage bargaining. The ultimatum game is an effective tool for understanding altruism, risk aversion, and generosity. We found two important results in this study. First; when the proposer knows the gender of the other party, his/her offers to women are lower than those to men. Latter; When the gender of the other party is known, female proposers bid higher than men. These results provide evidence that gender income inequality in the labor market may be due to the attitudes of employers (especially men employers). These results can actually explain why the female labor force participation rate is low in Turkey, but more detailed studies are needed on this subject. This study contributes to the literature as one of the few studies examining the wage bargaining of employers with male and female workers in Turkey.
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