{"title":"需求不确定性的Stackelberg双寡头垄断","authors":"A. Pinto, F. A. Ferreira, F. Ferreira","doi":"10.1109/ICCCYB.2006.305710","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider a symmetric Stackelberg model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by first and second movers. We analyse the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and prove that when the leading firm faces demand uncertainty, but the follower does not, the first mover does not necessarily have advantage over the second mover. Moreover, we show that the advantage of one firm over the other depends upon the demand fluctuation and also upon the degree of substitutability of the products.","PeriodicalId":160588,"journal":{"name":"2006 IEEE International Conference on Computational Cybernetics","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2006-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Stackelberg duopoly with demand uncertainty\",\"authors\":\"A. Pinto, F. A. Ferreira, F. Ferreira\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICCCYB.2006.305710\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We consider a symmetric Stackelberg model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by first and second movers. We analyse the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and prove that when the leading firm faces demand uncertainty, but the follower does not, the first mover does not necessarily have advantage over the second mover. Moreover, we show that the advantage of one firm over the other depends upon the demand fluctuation and also upon the degree of substitutability of the products.\",\"PeriodicalId\":160588,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2006 IEEE International Conference on Computational Cybernetics\",\"volume\":\"20 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2006-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2006 IEEE International Conference on Computational Cybernetics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCCYB.2006.305710\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2006 IEEE International Conference on Computational Cybernetics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCCYB.2006.305710","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We consider a symmetric Stackelberg model in which there is asymmetric demand information owned by first and second movers. We analyse the advantages of leadership and flexibility, and prove that when the leading firm faces demand uncertainty, but the follower does not, the first mover does not necessarily have advantage over the second mover. Moreover, we show that the advantage of one firm over the other depends upon the demand fluctuation and also upon the degree of substitutability of the products.
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