零信任网络的访问控制策略实施

Romans Vanickis, P. Jacob, Sohelia Dehghanzadeh, Brian A. Lee
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引用次数: 36

摘要

企业计算环境向雾/边缘计算和工业物联网(IIoT)等新兴趋势的演变,正在导致保护计算机网络的方法发生变化,以应对移动性、虚拟化基础设施、动态和异构用户环境以及基于事务的交互等挑战。这种动态性带来的不确定性给访问控制过程带来了更大的不确定性,激发了对基于风险的访问控制决策的需求。因此,传统的基于边界的安全范例正逐渐被抛弃,取而代之的是所谓的“零信任网络”(ZTN)。在ZTN中,网络被划分为不同的安全区域,根据安全区域所保护的资产,访问安全区域的资源需要不同的信任级别。所有对敏感信息的访问都受到基于用户和设备配置文件和上下文的严格访问控制。在本文中,我们概述了一个策略实施框架,以解决基于风险的ZTN访问控制的许多开放挑战。我们指定了所需策略语言的设计,包括用于表达防火墙规则的通用防火墙策略语言。我们设计了一种机制,将这些规则映射到特定的防火墙语法,并在防火墙上安装这些规则。我们通过一个小型的概念验证来展示我们设计的可行性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Access Control Policy Enforcement for Zero-Trust-Networking
The evolution of the enterprise computing landscape towards emerging trends such as fog/edge computing and the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) are leading to a change of approach to securing computer networks to deal with challenges such as mobility, virtualized infrastructures, dynamic and heterogeneous user contexts and transaction-based interactions. The uncertainty introduced by such dynamicity introduces greater uncertainty into the access control process and motivates the need for risk-based access control decision making. Thus, the traditional perimeter-based security paradigm is increasingly being abandoned in favour of a so called "zero trust networking" (ZTN). In ZTN networks are partitioned into zones with different levels of trust required to access the zone resources depending on the assets protected by the zone. All accesses to sensitive information is subject to rigorous access control based on user and device profile and context. In this paper we outline a policy enforcement framework to address many of open challenges for risk-based access control for ZTN. We specify the design of required policy languages including a generic firewall policy language to express firewall rules. We design a mechanism to map these rules to specific firewall syntax and to install the rules on the firewall. We show the viability of our design with a small proof-of-concept.
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