区域间公共交通供给的利益溢出与补贴输出

Dániel Hörcher, B. de Borger, D. Graham
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文以联邦政府和地方政府为模型,对跨区域公共交通提供进行了建模。这些服务原则上可以由(i)上级政府、(ii)某个地方政府或(iii)私人经营者经营。我们推导出每个所有权制度的最优定价和容量(频率)规则,并展示了给定选区的居民如何受到供应商选择的影响。我们发现最优供给在集权和分权制度下都会导致财政赤字。更重要的是,我们表明,如果这项服务是由联邦政府或邻近地区的政府提供的,当地居民可能会过得更好。通过这种方式,当地居民至少将部分补贴负担转移到其他地区,而他们仍然享受到该服务存在的溢出效益。更一般地说,这篇论文指出了规模经济存在的一种特殊机制:当地居民可能会反对权力下放,或者更愿意将运营和资助产生损失的服务的责任转移到其他地区。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Benefit Spillovers and Subsidy Exporting in Inter-Regional Public Transport Provision
This paper models inter-regional public transport provision with federal and local levels of government. Such services can in principle be operated by (i) the higher-level government, (ii) one of the local governments, or (iii) a private operator. We derive optimal pricing and capacity (frequency) rules for each ownership regime, and show how the residents of a given constituency are affected by the choice of supplier. We find that optimal supply leads to a financial deficit under centralised as well as decentralised regimes. More importantly, we show that local residents may be better off if the service is offered by the federal government or the government of a neighbouring region. This way local residents transfer at least a part of the subsidy burden to other regions, while they still do enjoy the spillover benefits from the existence of the service. More generally, the paper identifies a peculiar mechanism in the presence of scale economies: local residents may oppose decentralisation or prefer shifting the responsibility for operating and financing the loss-generating service to other regions.
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