基于FPGA的分组密码侧信道攻击密码分析

A. Bechtsoudis, N. Sklavos
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引用次数: 19

摘要

分组密码设计者假设秘密信息将在紧密可靠的计算环境中被操纵。不幸的是,这是不可行的,因为实际的计算单元和芯片在运行过程中存在实现信息泄漏。侧信道密码分析就是利用这个实现数据,提取密码的秘密信息。本文讨论了当前侧信道密码分析的研究现状。我们还分析了不同类别的侧信道攻击,并研究了针对FPGA设备的具体攻击如何导致秘密信息泄露。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Side Channel Attacks Cryptanalysis against Block Ciphers Based on FPGA Devices
The block cipher designers assume that the secret information will be manipulated in close and reliable computing environments. Unfortunately, this isn’t feasible because actual computing units and chips have implementation information leakage during their operation. Side channel cryptanalysis exploits this implementation data, in order to extract cipher’s secret information. In this paper, we discuss the current state-of-art of side channel cryptanalysis. We also analyze the different categories of side channel attacks and examine how concrete attacks against FPGA devices leads to secret information reveal.
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