{"title":"亚里士多德论“从假设出发”的三段论","authors":"Gisela Striker","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198868385.003.0001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In chapters 23 and 44 of Prior Analytics I, Aristotle discusses arguments ‘from a hypothesis’ and claims that these include the reductio-arguments. His descriptions in both chapters show that what direct and indirect arguments of this group have in common is that the ‘hypothesis’ is not a part of the argument, but either an agreement to the effect that a certain proposition will be accepted as proven if another proposition has been proven, or—in cases of reductio ad impossibile—a logical principle for which no explicit agreement is needed.","PeriodicalId":158069,"journal":{"name":"From Aristotle to Cicero","volume":"18 1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Aristotle on Syllogisms ‘from a Hypothesis’\",\"authors\":\"Gisela Striker\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780198868385.003.0001\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In chapters 23 and 44 of Prior Analytics I, Aristotle discusses arguments ‘from a hypothesis’ and claims that these include the reductio-arguments. His descriptions in both chapters show that what direct and indirect arguments of this group have in common is that the ‘hypothesis’ is not a part of the argument, but either an agreement to the effect that a certain proposition will be accepted as proven if another proposition has been proven, or—in cases of reductio ad impossibile—a logical principle for which no explicit agreement is needed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":158069,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"From Aristotle to Cicero\",\"volume\":\"18 1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-01-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"From Aristotle to Cicero\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868385.003.0001\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"From Aristotle to Cicero","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198868385.003.0001","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In chapters 23 and 44 of Prior Analytics I, Aristotle discusses arguments ‘from a hypothesis’ and claims that these include the reductio-arguments. His descriptions in both chapters show that what direct and indirect arguments of this group have in common is that the ‘hypothesis’ is not a part of the argument, but either an agreement to the effect that a certain proposition will be accepted as proven if another proposition has been proven, or—in cases of reductio ad impossibile—a logical principle for which no explicit agreement is needed.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
