{"title":"游戏,欺骗和琼斯引理","authors":"Zachariah E. Fuchs, P. Khargonekar","doi":"10.1109/ACC.2011.5991297","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Deception is pervasive in adversarial situations. Here we present a formulation of deception using a two-player game setting. One of the two players deploys a sensor network to gather information on the opponent who in turn can employ deception tactics. We solve the resulting general game using linear programs. We pose an illustrative example and develop closed form solutions for special cases. Finally, we show how our solutions capture the well-known \"Jones' Lemma\" from the deception literature.","PeriodicalId":225201,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference","volume":"48 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"11","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Games, deception, and Jones' Lemma\",\"authors\":\"Zachariah E. Fuchs, P. Khargonekar\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ACC.2011.5991297\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Deception is pervasive in adversarial situations. Here we present a formulation of deception using a two-player game setting. One of the two players deploys a sensor network to gather information on the opponent who in turn can employ deception tactics. We solve the resulting general game using linear programs. We pose an illustrative example and develop closed form solutions for special cases. Finally, we show how our solutions capture the well-known \\\"Jones' Lemma\\\" from the deception literature.\",\"PeriodicalId\":225201,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference\",\"volume\":\"48 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-08-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"11\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ACC.2011.5991297\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2011 American Control Conference","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ACC.2011.5991297","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Deception is pervasive in adversarial situations. Here we present a formulation of deception using a two-player game setting. One of the two players deploys a sensor network to gather information on the opponent who in turn can employ deception tactics. We solve the resulting general game using linear programs. We pose an illustrative example and develop closed form solutions for special cases. Finally, we show how our solutions capture the well-known "Jones' Lemma" from the deception literature.