所有个人投资者都是平等的吗?围绕证券诉讼事件的个人投资者交易证据

P. Griffin, Ning Zhu
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引用次数: 11

摘要

本研究考察了一个大样本的个人(零售)投资者围绕证券诉讼事件的交易行为。我们检验了这样一个假设,即这些投资者在诉讼集体期结束时(在纠正性披露的时候)和集体期开始时(在披露涉嫌虚假正面信息的时候)的反应在投资者知情程度的基础上有所不同。我们的测试拒绝了消息灵通的投资者与消息不灵通的投资者表现出相同交易行为的假设。这些结果通过记录个人投资者在揭示涉嫌金融欺诈的开始和结束的事件周围的交易差异,为文献做出了贡献。这些事件可能相对难以解释,因此,我们应该在信息的基础上观察差异并不是不合理的。我们还研究了个人投资者在类别期间的交易,并得出结论,交易强度在类别期间的早期更高,总体上相对于控制期更高。这些发现与通常用于计算集体诉讼损害赔偿的比例交易模型不一致,该模型假设所有股票的交易概率相等。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Are All Individual Investors Created Equal? Evidence from Individual Investor Trading Around Securities Litigation Events
This study examines the trading behavior of a large sample of individual (retail) investors around securities litigation events. We test the hypothesis that the response of these investors around the end of the litigation class period (at the time of a corrective disclosure) and the start of the class period (at the time of disclosure of allegedly false positive information) differs on the basis of the informedness of the investors. Our tests reject the hypothesis that more informed investors exhibit the same trading behavior as less informed investors. These results contribute to the literature by documenting differences in individual investor trading around events that reveal the start and end of an alleged financial fraud. These events can be relatively difficult to interpret and, so, it is not unreasonable that we should observe differences on the basis of informedness. We also examine individual investor trading within the class period and adduce that trading intensity is higher earlier in the class period, and higher overall relative to a control period. These findings are inconsistent with the often-applied proportional trading model for the calculation of class action damages, which assumes all shares trade with equal probability.
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