真理、成功和认识论

Zoe Drayson
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在《思考与感知》一书中,斯托克斯对“有害的认知效应假设”提出了挑战:该假设认为,如果我们的思想直接影响我们的感知体验,那么在认识论上就会出现问题。在这样做的过程中,斯托克斯认为自己是在用关于人类心理学的描述性主张来补充西格尔和里昂等哲学家的认识论主张。我认为他的结论比他们最初看起来更激进,在某种程度上,斯托克斯的项目与认知渗透的标准认识论讨论不一致。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Truth, success, and epistemology
In Thinking and Perceiving, Stokes challenges “the pernicious cognitive effects assumption”: the assumption that it would be epistemically problematic if our thoughts were to directly influence our perceptual experience. In doing so, Stokes takes himself to be supplementing the epistemological claims of philosophers like Siegel and Lyons with descriptive claims about human psychology. I argue that his conclusions are more radical than they first appear, to the extent that Stokes’s project is at odds with the standard epistemological discussions of cognitive penetration.  
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