有和没有政府的管治和效率

ERN: Structure Pub Date : 2018-04-27 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3221133

Francesco Angelini, G. Candela, Massimiliano Castellani

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文探讨了在有和没有国家的社会中，治理形式与效率之间的关系，以及几种具体的代理行为。使用一个理论框架，其中私人代理人能够或不能够有效地协调他们的行动，我们研究了治理形式如何影响每个社会的福利水平。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Governance and Efficiency With and Without Government

This paper explores the relationships between forms of governance and efficiency, in societies with and without State, with several specific agent behaviors. Using a theoretical framework where the private agents are, or are not, able to efficiently coordinate their actions, we study how forms of governance affect the level of welfare of each society.

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ERN: Structure

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