{"title":"联邦公开市场委员会的透明度和审议:计算语言学方法","authors":"Stephen Hansen, Michael McMahon, A. Prat","doi":"10.1093/qje/qjx045","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, aect the deliberation of monetary policymakers? We exploit a natural experiment in the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993 together with computational linguistic models (particularly Latent Dirichlet Allocation) to measure the eect of increased transparency on debate. Commentators have hypothesized both a benecial discipline eect","PeriodicalId":359449,"journal":{"name":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"443","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Transparency and deliberation within the FOMC: a computational linguistics approach\",\"authors\":\"Stephen Hansen, Michael McMahon, A. Prat\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/qje/qjx045\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, aect the deliberation of monetary policymakers? We exploit a natural experiment in the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993 together with computational linguistic models (particularly Latent Dirichlet Allocation) to measure the eect of increased transparency on debate. Commentators have hypothesized both a benecial discipline eect\",\"PeriodicalId\":359449,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics\",\"volume\":\"31 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"443\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx045\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSE Research Online Documents on Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx045","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Transparency and deliberation within the FOMC: a computational linguistics approach
How does transparency, a key feature of central bank design, aect the deliberation of monetary policymakers? We exploit a natural experiment in the Federal Open Market Committee in 1993 together with computational linguistic models (particularly Latent Dirichlet Allocation) to measure the eect of increased transparency on debate. Commentators have hypothesized both a benecial discipline eect