关于箭头林德定理的注解

R. Rees, L. Foldes
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引用次数: 35

摘要

适用于预期收益的贴现率。它还会支持政府参与私人投资,因为这样可以将风险分散到更多的人身上。仅对明确的假设进行审查就会对这种应用的一般有效性产生怀疑。对许多投资来说,独立的假设是不现实的,例如在基础设施和“基础”行业,这些行业的回报与国民收入高度相关。至少在以下三种情况下,认为随着人口趋于无穷大,任何人获得的投资净收益份额变得可以忽略不计的假设是不可接受的:对于公共产品,收益不是“共享”的,而是随着人口的增加而增加;规模必须与人口规模大致成比例调整的项目(如建设电网配电系统);对于那些全部或部分受益于定理意义上的“小”部分人口的项目。最后一项保留不仅适用于那些专门为只使一小部分人口受益的项目,而且也适用于那些不可避免地使有限群体受益的项目的特殊利益和费用。阿罗和林德在他们的正式讨论中避免了这个问题,他们假设政府对所有的利益征税并补偿所有的损失,尽管他们承认这是不现实的。尽管如此,本说明或多或少按照自己的条件接受了阿罗-林德方法,并更充分地考虑了有关财政制度和公共支出的某些隐含假设的作用。具体来说,我们应该记得,阿罗和林德只使用两个随机变量,即典型个人的可支配收入和政府分配项目收益的收入。尽管后者在
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Note on the Arrow-Lind Theorem
discount rate applied to expected returns. It would also argue in favor of state participation in private investments where this allows risks to be spread over a larger number of persons. A review of the explicit assumptions alone must cast doubt on the general validity of such applications. The assumption of independence is unrealistic for many investments, for example in infrastructure and "basic" industries whose returns are highly correlated with national income. The assumption that the share of the net benefits of an investment accruing to any person becomes negligible as population tends to infinity is unacceptable in at least three cases: for public goods, where the benefit is not "shared" but increases with the population; for projects whose scale must be adjusted roughly in proportion to the size of population (such as the construction of a grid system of electricity distribution); and for projects whose benefits accrue wholly or in part to a section of the population which is "small" in the sense of the theorem. The last reservation applies not merely to those projects which are specifically designed to benefit only a small part of the population, but also to those special benefits and costs from any project which happen to accrue unavoidably to limited groups. Arrow and Lind avoid this problem in their formal discussion by assuming that the government taxes all benefits and compensates all losses, although they acknowledge that this is unrealistic. Be that as it may, the present note accepts the Arrow-Lind approach more or less on its own terms, and considers more fully the role of certain implicit assumptions concerning the fiscal system and public expenditure. Specifically, it will be recalled that Arrow and Lind work with only two random variables, the disposable income of a typical individual and the income from distribution of project retums by the government. Although the latter is referred to in
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