{"title":"俄罗斯与欧洲极右翼的蜜月期","authors":"M. Laruelle","doi":"10.7591/cornell/9781501754135.003.0008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter examines how the Kremlin developed a policy of reaching out globally to Western far-right and populist parties. It asserts that today's Russia plays a multifaceted game of consolidating its soft power on the European stage. The chapter also reviews Russia's alliance with the European far right and its strengthening economic ties, especially energy partnerships; networking with big European businesses that are able to lobby their respective governments; and relaunching an offensive public diplomacy. It discusses the European far right's Russophile tendencies, admiring prerevolutionary Russia, whether for its autocratic regime or for the prominent role given to Orthodoxy. Ultimately, the chapter looks at the direct connections between Russians and European far-right groups after the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the opening of borders. It illustrates the mutual encounters of Russian far-right activists and Western European counterparts in three main phases: they were first pioneered by precursor figures in the 1990s, followed by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Rodina party in the early 2000s, before the relationship reached a peak when Moscow decided to position itself as the herald of a new moralist International during Vladimir Putin's third presidential mandate.","PeriodicalId":242339,"journal":{"name":"Is Russia Fascist?","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Russia’s Honeymoon with the European Far Right\",\"authors\":\"M. Laruelle\",\"doi\":\"10.7591/cornell/9781501754135.003.0008\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter examines how the Kremlin developed a policy of reaching out globally to Western far-right and populist parties. It asserts that today's Russia plays a multifaceted game of consolidating its soft power on the European stage. The chapter also reviews Russia's alliance with the European far right and its strengthening economic ties, especially energy partnerships; networking with big European businesses that are able to lobby their respective governments; and relaunching an offensive public diplomacy. It discusses the European far right's Russophile tendencies, admiring prerevolutionary Russia, whether for its autocratic regime or for the prominent role given to Orthodoxy. Ultimately, the chapter looks at the direct connections between Russians and European far-right groups after the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the opening of borders. It illustrates the mutual encounters of Russian far-right activists and Western European counterparts in three main phases: they were first pioneered by precursor figures in the 1990s, followed by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Rodina party in the early 2000s, before the relationship reached a peak when Moscow decided to position itself as the herald of a new moralist International during Vladimir Putin's third presidential mandate.\",\"PeriodicalId\":242339,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Is Russia Fascist?\",\"volume\":\"6 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-03-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Is Russia Fascist?\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754135.003.0008\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Is Russia Fascist?","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754135.003.0008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter examines how the Kremlin developed a policy of reaching out globally to Western far-right and populist parties. It asserts that today's Russia plays a multifaceted game of consolidating its soft power on the European stage. The chapter also reviews Russia's alliance with the European far right and its strengthening economic ties, especially energy partnerships; networking with big European businesses that are able to lobby their respective governments; and relaunching an offensive public diplomacy. It discusses the European far right's Russophile tendencies, admiring prerevolutionary Russia, whether for its autocratic regime or for the prominent role given to Orthodoxy. Ultimately, the chapter looks at the direct connections between Russians and European far-right groups after the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the opening of borders. It illustrates the mutual encounters of Russian far-right activists and Western European counterparts in three main phases: they were first pioneered by precursor figures in the 1990s, followed by the Russian Orthodox Church and the Rodina party in the early 2000s, before the relationship reached a peak when Moscow decided to position itself as the herald of a new moralist International during Vladimir Putin's third presidential mandate.