{"title":"注:前赌注的稳定彩票","authors":"Jan Christoph Schlegel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3077210","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent-object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.","PeriodicalId":282303,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Equity","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Note on Ex-Ante Stable Lotteries\",\"authors\":\"Jan Christoph Schlegel\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3077210\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent-object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.\",\"PeriodicalId\":282303,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ERN: Equity\",\"volume\":\"26 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-11-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ERN: Equity\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3077210\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Equity","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3077210","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent-object pairs have a positive probability of being matched in an ex-ante stable assignment. We interpret our result as an impossibility result. With ex-ante stability one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.