捍卫爆炸性的普遍小说

IF 1 2区 艺术学 0 ART
NATHAN WILDMAN, CHRISTIAN FOLDE
{"title":"捍卫爆炸性的普遍小说","authors":"NATHAN WILDMAN,&nbsp;CHRISTIAN FOLDE","doi":"10.1111/jaac.12721","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We think FMP is false, as not every fiction is closed under conditional elimination.</p><p>If you achieve both steps, then, because (2) is a conditional and (1) is its antecedent, <i>f</i>'s closure under FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> ensures that the consequent is also true-in-<i>f</i>. And since the consequent is that every proposition is true, it follows that <i>f</i> is a universal fiction.</p><p>Ricksand (<span>2020</span>) raises three objections to our proposal. Here, we take the opportunity to reply to these concerns, thereby clarifying and expanding on our argument.</p><p>Before turning to Ricksand's objections, it is useful to discuss the background dialectic. Doing so will clarify our ecumenical approach and serve as a foundation for our replies.</p><p>There are (at least!) two substantive difficulties one faces when following our recipe. The first concerns ensuring that (1) and (2) are part of <i>f</i>'s content. Addressing this requires saying something about the broader question of how to make a particular proposition true in a given fiction.</p><p>This is a hoary, difficult matter, to which there is no straightforward answer. One naïve idea is that <i>saying makes it so</i>; roughly, if some statement is explicitly made in a fiction (for example, by the fiction's narrator), then the expressed proposition is true in that fiction. Philosophers and literary theorists have roundly (and rightly) rejected this stipulatory account, as, for example, any fiction featuring an unreliable narrator is a counterexample. A second, related notion is intentionalism: if the (or an) author of fiction <i>f</i> intends that <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>, then <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>. This approach has also been largely rejected, running into numerous apparent counterexamples (see, for example, Lewis <span>1978</span>, though see also, Stock <span>2017</span>).</p><p>Another way of being part of <i>f</i>'s content is to be imported, that is, a proposition brought into the fiction from the outside. However, what (if any) propositions should be imported is another controversial matter.<sup>3</sup> Yet another way is to be implied; that is, if <i>p</i> is a logical consequence of some proposition that is true-in-<i>f</i>, then <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>. This is especially unhelpful, since not only does it move the bubble in the carpet (since it requires that we already know some of <i>f</i>'s content), but it is not clear which notion of logical consequence we should employ.</p><p>We mention these to highlight that there is no good general story about how to guarantee that a proposition is true in particular fiction. This makes addressing the first issue extremely difficult, as it is hard to know whether one has succeeded in making (1) and (2) true in <i>f</i>.<sup>4</sup></p><p>The second difficulty concerns ensuring that <i>f</i> is governed by FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub>. As before, there is a lurking larger problem: namely, settling what (if any) principles constitute the logic of fictional truth. At least at first glance, not all fictions’ content obeys the same logical principles. For example, Priest's <i>Sylvan's Box</i> and Bradbury's <i>A Sound of Thunder</i> are inconsistent, yet their content is not governed by the principle of explosion (otherwise, they would be universal too). Similarly, essentially incomplete fictions like <i>Blade Runner</i> seem to violate the principle that, if (P or Q) is true-in-<i>f</i>, then P is true-in-<i>f</i> or Q is true-in-f.<sup>5</sup> These issues have led some, such as Routley (<span>1979</span>, 10) to hold that there is no uniform logic of fictional truth.<sup>6</sup> If Routley is correct, then proving that <i>f</i>'s content obeys FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> becomes that much harder (and explains why we need to appeal to local, rather than global principles).</p><p>In light of these substantive disagreements, in our argument for universal fictions, we wanted to avoid committing to any specific view and make as few controversial assumptions as possible. So, to ensure that (1) and (2) are part of <i>f</i>'s content, we suggested including explicit statements in <i>f</i> that expressed the relevant propositions. This is because, while we think that saying does not always make it so, it generally does. That is, if fiction <i>f</i> includes an explicit statement that expresses a proposition <i>p</i>, then, ceteris paribus, <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>. Consequently, including these explicit statements is a fairly uncontroversial way of getting (1) and (2) to be part of <i>f</i>'s content.<sup>7</sup> To stress, we do not think this is the only way of doing this, just the least controversial way.</p><p>Our strategy concerning the second issue was also ecumenical. Specifically, we suggested including an “innocuous” conditional and antecedent as part of f's content. Together, these strongly suggest (though do not strictly entail) that the relevant consequent is also true-in-<i>f</i>. In turn, this means that <i>f</i>'s content is closed under FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub>. And denying this closure would require denying the fictional truth of the consequent, which is “utterly implausible” (2017, 78). For example, in our <i>Monsieur Impossible</i>, we included that (i) if Monsieur Impossible is a member of the King's Musketeers, then he works for the King, and that (ii) Monsieur Impossible is a member of the Musketeers; the intuitive result is that (iii) Monsieur Impossible works for the King is also fictionally true. This strongly suggests that <i>Monsieur Impossible</i> is closed under FMP-LOCAL<sub>MI</sub>, as denying this would seem to require denying the (extremely plausible) fictional truth of (iii). As before, we do not think this is the only way to guarantee that FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> is true of <i>f</i>, but is, we believe, a fairly uncontroversial method, compatible with a wide variety of views about the logic of fictional truth.</p><p>We would be the first to admit that neither of these solutions are indisputable (what philosophical arguments are?). Nor are these strategies the only way to resolve these two issues. But they are likely the best one can do without providing deep and controversial answers to the two lurking general questions outlined above. If one has a completely worked out story about the necessary and sufficient conditions for fictional truth as well as an account of the logic of fictional truth, then you could probably do better. Yet that was not our goal. We wanted to sketch a recipe for generating universal fictions that was as theory neutral as possible.</p><p>With this background discussion out of the way, we turn to Ricksand's objections.</p><p>In reply, we offered cases where the “innocuous” conditional and antecedent are inconsistent, though the consequent is suitably mundane. For example, our <i>Clara's Crazy Caper</i> (2017, 78) included the conditional (i) if exactly three and not exactly three carrots are consumed, then some carrots have been consumed, as well as the contradiction (ii) exactly three and not exactly three carrots are consumed. As before, it is strongly intuitive that, given this setup, this makes (iii) some carrots have been consumed is true-in-<i>CCC</i>. Thus, the same argument applies: either the objector grants that the consequence is part of the fiction's content, in which case they must accept that the content is governed by the unrestricted FMP-LOCAL<sub>CCC</sub>, or they have to take on the “utterly implausible” consequence that (iii) is not true-in-<i>CCC</i>. At minimum, this places the burden of proof on the objector.</p><p>Here, Ricksand objects that, “it is not clear why this example… would pose a problem to an objector.” If the objection “consists of categorically denying that instances of FMP-LOCAL can be fictionally true when [the antecedent] is inconsistent, it hardly amounts to a counterargument to provide another example … where [the antecedent] is inconsistent, since this is the very kind of case the objector will not accept” (<span>2020</span>, 236).</p><p>In reply, first note that the issue is not whether an instance of FMP-LOCAL is fictionally true; what matters is whether it is true of, not in the relevant fiction. Rather, Ricksand's objector must “categorically deny” that any instance of the fictional truth of both a conditional and the relevant inconsistent antecedent entails the fictional truth of the consequent. This categorical denial looks extremely difficult to maintain. For example, suppose that (i) ((P&amp;P) → ((P&amp;P) &amp; Q)), (ii) (P&amp;P), and (iii) Q are all true-in-<i>f</i>. Denying that (iii) is true-in-<i>f</i> because (i) and (ii) feature a contradiction looks ridiculous. Yet, this is what Ricksand's objector is committed to. At minimum, this objector bears the burden of proof of explaining why we should accept this strongly counterintuitive result. And, until this is forthcoming, we have enough to warrant thinking that <i>f</i> is closed under FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub>.</p><p>Ricksand's second objection concerns our discussion of an alternative universal fiction recipe.<sup>8</sup> Per this alternative, one can produce a universal fiction <i>f</i>* by telling a story that explicitly includes some statement like, “everything is true.”<sup>9</sup> This is meant to entail that every proposition is true-in-<i>f</i>*.</p><p>We have significant worries about this alternative recipe (2017, 74–75). We illustrated our worries via an analogy: that “everyone is treacherous” is true-in-<i>Threepenny-Opera</i> does not entail that, for example, “Obama is treacherous” is true-in-<i>Threepenny</i>. This is because, plausibly, the “everyone” quantifier only ranges over characters in the story, and not every individual is part of <i>Threepenny</i>'s cast. Similarly, it is plausible that “everything is true” being true-in-<i>f</i>* does not entail that absolutely every proposition is true-in-<i>f</i>*. This is because, plausibly, the “everything” quantifier only ranges over those propositions that are in fact true-in-<i>f</i>*, and not every proposition is part of <i>f</i>*’s content. So, we think it is best to “sidestep [this] route and offer a different pathway to universal fictions” (2017, 75).</p><p>Ricksand's second objection is that our worries about the alternative recipe apply equally to our own. In brief, why think that the quantifier in the principle of explosion has a universal range, while the “everything” in these other stories is restricted?</p><p>As well as apparently undermining our recipe, Ricksand suggests that this demonstrates the “triviality” of FMP. This is because we “concede that [FMP does] not obtain with necessity in all fictions, and that it is only a local version of FMP which allows for the construction of a universal fiction, since the principles necessary for rendering a fiction universal must be presented explicitly in order to obtain. However, by conceding that no version of FMP obtains without explicit statements to that effect they also inadvertently undermine their own criticism” (Ricksand <span>2020</span>, 236).</p><p>First, the issue is to have FMP-LOCAL be true of, not true <i>in</i> the relevant fiction—we want the content to be closed under the principle, not for the principle to be part of the content. Second, it is hard to see how FMP is “trivial” if it is true of some but not all fictions. Third, we do not concede that no version of FMP obtains without some explicit statement that it does so. Our argument for FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> involves no such a statement, and, frankly, we would not even know what sort of explicit claim one could make that would be of any use. “FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> governs <i>f</i>'s content” being part of <i>f</i>'s primary, explicit content certainly entails that “FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> governs <i>f</i>'s content” is true-in-<i>f</i>. But, it does not entail that FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> in fact governs <i>f</i>'s content, which is what matters here.<sup>10</sup></p><p>Setting these aside, one reason for thinking the “Everything is true” quantifier is restricted, while our explosion quantifier is unrestricted is that there is no way to secure the relevant range for the former without appealing to something like authorial stipulation, a point that one advocate of this recipe readily admits (Deutsch <span>1985</span>, 209n16). In contrast, the explosive quantifier is presumed to be absolutely unrestricted, because, when discussing explosion, logicians nearly universally accept that it is so.<sup>11</sup> So, we do not need to do anything to make it unrestricted—it comes ready-made that way—but the alternative recipe must rely upon stipulation. And given the substantive debate about the limitations of authorial stipulation, we think this is problematic. This is not to say that this other method <i>must</i> fail—indeed, we never said anything like that! Rather, we think it is better to avoid getting tangled in these “thorny issues” about authorial intent (2017, 75) in favor of our approach.</p><p>A second difference is that one can think of the principle of explosions as a derivation or inference rule (for example, that, from a true contradiction, one can derive/infer any proposition). This “generative” understanding fits with our recipe for generating universal fictions: assuming that the relevant fiction's content includes a contradiction and the principle of explosion, one can then use this combination to derive/infer every proposition within the fiction.<sup>12</sup> Further, it does not seem subject to the restricted quantification range worry. However, there is no way to understand the “Everything is true” claim nonquantificationally. Thus, any recipe that relies upon it is subject to the worry. Since our approach potentially avoids it, this looks like another point in its favor.</p><p>These indicate that there is a substantive difference between our recipe and the “everything is true” alternative, which suffices to undercut Ricksand's second objection.</p><p>First, a point of clarification: no one should accept that including in fiction <i>f</i> the statement, “<i>q</i> is fictionally true” is enough to make <i>q</i> true-in-<i>f</i>. That “<i>q</i> is fictionally true” is true-in-<i>f</i> means that, in f, <i>q</i> is true in <i>some</i> fiction, which may or may not be <i>f</i>. Meanwhile, <i>q</i>'s being true-in-<i>f</i> means that, in <i>f</i>, q. And, obviously, the former does not entail the latter.<sup>13</sup> Presumably, Ricksand meant that including in fiction f the statement that “<i>q</i> is true” is enough to make <i>q</i> true-in-<i>f</i>. So, we direct our reply to this suitably modified version of the dilemma.</p><p>We are happy to reject the first horn. We do not think that explicitly stating that <i>q</i> (in the relevant text) is sufficient to make <i>q</i> true-in-<i>f</i>. (Though it is worth stressing again that our recipe requires that FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> be true <i>of</i> and not <i>in</i> fiction <i>f</i>.)<sup>14</sup></p><p>However, rejecting the idea that (explicitly) saying makes it so does not, contra Ricksand, entail that “some propositions cannot be fictionally true only by virtue of being explicitly stated” (<span>2020</span>, 237). It does entail that some attempts to make some proposition(s) fictionally true by means of explicit statement fail. But it does not entail that, for some particular proposition, every attempt to make it fictionally true via explicit inclusion must fail. This non-entailment is enough to undermine the dilemma's second horn. So, Ricksand's dilemma is no threat either.<sup>15</sup></p><p>The general upshot is that Ricksand's objections do not threaten our recipe for universal fictions. Regardless, thinking about them was helpful for clarifying a number of points. For this reason, we thank him for engaging with our work. Finally, to conclude, we would like to mirror our previous ending: even if we have not convinced everyone that universal fictions are possible, we think that highlighting what moves must be made to accept or reject this possibility is interesting in its own right.</p>","PeriodicalId":51571,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/jaac.12721","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Defending Explosive Universal Fictions\",\"authors\":\"NATHAN WILDMAN,&nbsp;CHRISTIAN FOLDE\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/jaac.12721\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We think FMP is false, as not every fiction is closed under conditional elimination.</p><p>If you achieve both steps, then, because (2) is a conditional and (1) is its antecedent, <i>f</i>'s closure under FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> ensures that the consequent is also true-in-<i>f</i>. And since the consequent is that every proposition is true, it follows that <i>f</i> is a universal fiction.</p><p>Ricksand (<span>2020</span>) raises three objections to our proposal. Here, we take the opportunity to reply to these concerns, thereby clarifying and expanding on our argument.</p><p>Before turning to Ricksand's objections, it is useful to discuss the background dialectic. Doing so will clarify our ecumenical approach and serve as a foundation for our replies.</p><p>There are (at least!) two substantive difficulties one faces when following our recipe. The first concerns ensuring that (1) and (2) are part of <i>f</i>'s content. Addressing this requires saying something about the broader question of how to make a particular proposition true in a given fiction.</p><p>This is a hoary, difficult matter, to which there is no straightforward answer. One naïve idea is that <i>saying makes it so</i>; roughly, if some statement is explicitly made in a fiction (for example, by the fiction's narrator), then the expressed proposition is true in that fiction. Philosophers and literary theorists have roundly (and rightly) rejected this stipulatory account, as, for example, any fiction featuring an unreliable narrator is a counterexample. A second, related notion is intentionalism: if the (or an) author of fiction <i>f</i> intends that <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>, then <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>. This approach has also been largely rejected, running into numerous apparent counterexamples (see, for example, Lewis <span>1978</span>, though see also, Stock <span>2017</span>).</p><p>Another way of being part of <i>f</i>'s content is to be imported, that is, a proposition brought into the fiction from the outside. However, what (if any) propositions should be imported is another controversial matter.<sup>3</sup> Yet another way is to be implied; that is, if <i>p</i> is a logical consequence of some proposition that is true-in-<i>f</i>, then <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>. This is especially unhelpful, since not only does it move the bubble in the carpet (since it requires that we already know some of <i>f</i>'s content), but it is not clear which notion of logical consequence we should employ.</p><p>We mention these to highlight that there is no good general story about how to guarantee that a proposition is true in particular fiction. This makes addressing the first issue extremely difficult, as it is hard to know whether one has succeeded in making (1) and (2) true in <i>f</i>.<sup>4</sup></p><p>The second difficulty concerns ensuring that <i>f</i> is governed by FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub>. As before, there is a lurking larger problem: namely, settling what (if any) principles constitute the logic of fictional truth. At least at first glance, not all fictions’ content obeys the same logical principles. For example, Priest's <i>Sylvan's Box</i> and Bradbury's <i>A Sound of Thunder</i> are inconsistent, yet their content is not governed by the principle of explosion (otherwise, they would be universal too). Similarly, essentially incomplete fictions like <i>Blade Runner</i> seem to violate the principle that, if (P or Q) is true-in-<i>f</i>, then P is true-in-<i>f</i> or Q is true-in-f.<sup>5</sup> These issues have led some, such as Routley (<span>1979</span>, 10) to hold that there is no uniform logic of fictional truth.<sup>6</sup> If Routley is correct, then proving that <i>f</i>'s content obeys FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> becomes that much harder (and explains why we need to appeal to local, rather than global principles).</p><p>In light of these substantive disagreements, in our argument for universal fictions, we wanted to avoid committing to any specific view and make as few controversial assumptions as possible. So, to ensure that (1) and (2) are part of <i>f</i>'s content, we suggested including explicit statements in <i>f</i> that expressed the relevant propositions. This is because, while we think that saying does not always make it so, it generally does. That is, if fiction <i>f</i> includes an explicit statement that expresses a proposition <i>p</i>, then, ceteris paribus, <i>p</i> is true-in-<i>f</i>. Consequently, including these explicit statements is a fairly uncontroversial way of getting (1) and (2) to be part of <i>f</i>'s content.<sup>7</sup> To stress, we do not think this is the only way of doing this, just the least controversial way.</p><p>Our strategy concerning the second issue was also ecumenical. Specifically, we suggested including an “innocuous” conditional and antecedent as part of f's content. Together, these strongly suggest (though do not strictly entail) that the relevant consequent is also true-in-<i>f</i>. In turn, this means that <i>f</i>'s content is closed under FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub>. And denying this closure would require denying the fictional truth of the consequent, which is “utterly implausible” (2017, 78). For example, in our <i>Monsieur Impossible</i>, we included that (i) if Monsieur Impossible is a member of the King's Musketeers, then he works for the King, and that (ii) Monsieur Impossible is a member of the Musketeers; the intuitive result is that (iii) Monsieur Impossible works for the King is also fictionally true. This strongly suggests that <i>Monsieur Impossible</i> is closed under FMP-LOCAL<sub>MI</sub>, as denying this would seem to require denying the (extremely plausible) fictional truth of (iii). As before, we do not think this is the only way to guarantee that FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> is true of <i>f</i>, but is, we believe, a fairly uncontroversial method, compatible with a wide variety of views about the logic of fictional truth.</p><p>We would be the first to admit that neither of these solutions are indisputable (what philosophical arguments are?). Nor are these strategies the only way to resolve these two issues. But they are likely the best one can do without providing deep and controversial answers to the two lurking general questions outlined above. If one has a completely worked out story about the necessary and sufficient conditions for fictional truth as well as an account of the logic of fictional truth, then you could probably do better. Yet that was not our goal. We wanted to sketch a recipe for generating universal fictions that was as theory neutral as possible.</p><p>With this background discussion out of the way, we turn to Ricksand's objections.</p><p>In reply, we offered cases where the “innocuous” conditional and antecedent are inconsistent, though the consequent is suitably mundane. For example, our <i>Clara's Crazy Caper</i> (2017, 78) included the conditional (i) if exactly three and not exactly three carrots are consumed, then some carrots have been consumed, as well as the contradiction (ii) exactly three and not exactly three carrots are consumed. As before, it is strongly intuitive that, given this setup, this makes (iii) some carrots have been consumed is true-in-<i>CCC</i>. Thus, the same argument applies: either the objector grants that the consequence is part of the fiction's content, in which case they must accept that the content is governed by the unrestricted FMP-LOCAL<sub>CCC</sub>, or they have to take on the “utterly implausible” consequence that (iii) is not true-in-<i>CCC</i>. At minimum, this places the burden of proof on the objector.</p><p>Here, Ricksand objects that, “it is not clear why this example… would pose a problem to an objector.” If the objection “consists of categorically denying that instances of FMP-LOCAL can be fictionally true when [the antecedent] is inconsistent, it hardly amounts to a counterargument to provide another example … where [the antecedent] is inconsistent, since this is the very kind of case the objector will not accept” (<span>2020</span>, 236).</p><p>In reply, first note that the issue is not whether an instance of FMP-LOCAL is fictionally true; what matters is whether it is true of, not in the relevant fiction. Rather, Ricksand's objector must “categorically deny” that any instance of the fictional truth of both a conditional and the relevant inconsistent antecedent entails the fictional truth of the consequent. This categorical denial looks extremely difficult to maintain. For example, suppose that (i) ((P&amp;P) → ((P&amp;P) &amp; Q)), (ii) (P&amp;P), and (iii) Q are all true-in-<i>f</i>. Denying that (iii) is true-in-<i>f</i> because (i) and (ii) feature a contradiction looks ridiculous. Yet, this is what Ricksand's objector is committed to. At minimum, this objector bears the burden of proof of explaining why we should accept this strongly counterintuitive result. And, until this is forthcoming, we have enough to warrant thinking that <i>f</i> is closed under FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub>.</p><p>Ricksand's second objection concerns our discussion of an alternative universal fiction recipe.<sup>8</sup> Per this alternative, one can produce a universal fiction <i>f</i>* by telling a story that explicitly includes some statement like, “everything is true.”<sup>9</sup> This is meant to entail that every proposition is true-in-<i>f</i>*.</p><p>We have significant worries about this alternative recipe (2017, 74–75). We illustrated our worries via an analogy: that “everyone is treacherous” is true-in-<i>Threepenny-Opera</i> does not entail that, for example, “Obama is treacherous” is true-in-<i>Threepenny</i>. This is because, plausibly, the “everyone” quantifier only ranges over characters in the story, and not every individual is part of <i>Threepenny</i>'s cast. Similarly, it is plausible that “everything is true” being true-in-<i>f</i>* does not entail that absolutely every proposition is true-in-<i>f</i>*. This is because, plausibly, the “everything” quantifier only ranges over those propositions that are in fact true-in-<i>f</i>*, and not every proposition is part of <i>f</i>*’s content. So, we think it is best to “sidestep [this] route and offer a different pathway to universal fictions” (2017, 75).</p><p>Ricksand's second objection is that our worries about the alternative recipe apply equally to our own. In brief, why think that the quantifier in the principle of explosion has a universal range, while the “everything” in these other stories is restricted?</p><p>As well as apparently undermining our recipe, Ricksand suggests that this demonstrates the “triviality” of FMP. This is because we “concede that [FMP does] not obtain with necessity in all fictions, and that it is only a local version of FMP which allows for the construction of a universal fiction, since the principles necessary for rendering a fiction universal must be presented explicitly in order to obtain. However, by conceding that no version of FMP obtains without explicit statements to that effect they also inadvertently undermine their own criticism” (Ricksand <span>2020</span>, 236).</p><p>First, the issue is to have FMP-LOCAL be true of, not true <i>in</i> the relevant fiction—we want the content to be closed under the principle, not for the principle to be part of the content. Second, it is hard to see how FMP is “trivial” if it is true of some but not all fictions. Third, we do not concede that no version of FMP obtains without some explicit statement that it does so. Our argument for FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> involves no such a statement, and, frankly, we would not even know what sort of explicit claim one could make that would be of any use. “FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> governs <i>f</i>'s content” being part of <i>f</i>'s primary, explicit content certainly entails that “FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> governs <i>f</i>'s content” is true-in-<i>f</i>. But, it does not entail that FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> in fact governs <i>f</i>'s content, which is what matters here.<sup>10</sup></p><p>Setting these aside, one reason for thinking the “Everything is true” quantifier is restricted, while our explosion quantifier is unrestricted is that there is no way to secure the relevant range for the former without appealing to something like authorial stipulation, a point that one advocate of this recipe readily admits (Deutsch <span>1985</span>, 209n16). In contrast, the explosive quantifier is presumed to be absolutely unrestricted, because, when discussing explosion, logicians nearly universally accept that it is so.<sup>11</sup> So, we do not need to do anything to make it unrestricted—it comes ready-made that way—but the alternative recipe must rely upon stipulation. And given the substantive debate about the limitations of authorial stipulation, we think this is problematic. This is not to say that this other method <i>must</i> fail—indeed, we never said anything like that! Rather, we think it is better to avoid getting tangled in these “thorny issues” about authorial intent (2017, 75) in favor of our approach.</p><p>A second difference is that one can think of the principle of explosions as a derivation or inference rule (for example, that, from a true contradiction, one can derive/infer any proposition). This “generative” understanding fits with our recipe for generating universal fictions: assuming that the relevant fiction's content includes a contradiction and the principle of explosion, one can then use this combination to derive/infer every proposition within the fiction.<sup>12</sup> Further, it does not seem subject to the restricted quantification range worry. However, there is no way to understand the “Everything is true” claim nonquantificationally. Thus, any recipe that relies upon it is subject to the worry. Since our approach potentially avoids it, this looks like another point in its favor.</p><p>These indicate that there is a substantive difference between our recipe and the “everything is true” alternative, which suffices to undercut Ricksand's second objection.</p><p>First, a point of clarification: no one should accept that including in fiction <i>f</i> the statement, “<i>q</i> is fictionally true” is enough to make <i>q</i> true-in-<i>f</i>. That “<i>q</i> is fictionally true” is true-in-<i>f</i> means that, in f, <i>q</i> is true in <i>some</i> fiction, which may or may not be <i>f</i>. Meanwhile, <i>q</i>'s being true-in-<i>f</i> means that, in <i>f</i>, q. And, obviously, the former does not entail the latter.<sup>13</sup> Presumably, Ricksand meant that including in fiction f the statement that “<i>q</i> is true” is enough to make <i>q</i> true-in-<i>f</i>. So, we direct our reply to this suitably modified version of the dilemma.</p><p>We are happy to reject the first horn. We do not think that explicitly stating that <i>q</i> (in the relevant text) is sufficient to make <i>q</i> true-in-<i>f</i>. (Though it is worth stressing again that our recipe requires that FMP-LOCAL<sub>f</sub> be true <i>of</i> and not <i>in</i> fiction <i>f</i>.)<sup>14</sup></p><p>However, rejecting the idea that (explicitly) saying makes it so does not, contra Ricksand, entail that “some propositions cannot be fictionally true only by virtue of being explicitly stated” (<span>2020</span>, 237). It does entail that some attempts to make some proposition(s) fictionally true by means of explicit statement fail. But it does not entail that, for some particular proposition, every attempt to make it fictionally true via explicit inclusion must fail. This non-entailment is enough to undermine the dilemma's second horn. So, Ricksand's dilemma is no threat either.<sup>15</sup></p><p>The general upshot is that Ricksand's objections do not threaten our recipe for universal fictions. Regardless, thinking about them was helpful for clarifying a number of points. For this reason, we thank him for engaging with our work. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们认为FMP是错误的,因为不是每个小说都在条件消除下关闭。如果您实现了这两个步骤,那么,由于(2)是一个条件,而(1)是它的前提,f在FMP-LOCALf下的闭包确保了结果在f中也是真实的。既然结论是每个命题都为真,那么就可以得出f是一个普遍虚构。里克桑德(2020)对我们的提议提出了三点反对意见。在此,我们借此机会对这些关切作出答复,从而澄清和扩大我们的论点。在讨论里克桑的反对意见之前,讨论一下背景辩证法是有用的。这样做将澄清我们的普世做法,并作为我们答复的基础。在遵循我们的食谱时,人们(至少!)会面临两个实质性的困难。第一个问题是确保(1)和(2)是f内容的一部分。要解决这个问题,就需要讨论一个更广泛的问题,即如何在给定的小说中证明一个特定的命题是正确的。这是一个古老而困难的问题,没有直接的答案。naïve的一种观点是,说的就是这样;粗略地说,如果某个陈述是在小说中明确提出的(例如,由小说的叙述者),那么所表达的命题在该小说中是正确的。哲学家和文学理论家已经全面地(而且正确地)拒绝了这种规定性的描述,例如,任何以不可靠的叙述者为特征的小说都是一个反例。第二个相关的概念是意向性:如果小说f的作者(或作者)想要p在f中为真,那么p在f中为真。这种方法也在很大程度上遭到了拒绝,遇到了许多明显的反例(例如,参见Lewis 1978,尽管也参见Stock 2017)。另一种成为f内容一部分的方式是输入,也就是说,一个命题从外部被带入小说。然而,应该引进什么(如果有的话)命题是另一个有争议的问题另一种方式是暗示;也就是说,如果p是某个命题在f中为真的逻辑推论,那么p在f中为真。这尤其没有帮助,因为它不仅移动了地毯上的气泡(因为它要求我们已经知道f的一些内容),而且不清楚我们应该使用哪个逻辑结果概念。我们提到这些是为了强调,在特定的小说中,没有好的一般故事来保证一个命题是真的。这使得解决第一个问题极其困难,因为很难知道一个人是否成功地使f.4中的(1)和(2)为真。第二个困难涉及确保f由FMP-LOCALf管理。和以前一样,还有一个潜在的更大的问题:即解决构成虚构真理逻辑的原则(如果有的话)。至少乍一看,并非所有小说的内容都遵循同样的逻辑原则。例如,Priest的《Sylvan’s Box》和Bradbury的《A Sound of Thunder》是不一致的,但它们的内容并不受爆炸原理的支配(否则它们也会是普遍的)。类似地,像《银翼杀手》这样本质上不完整的小说似乎违反了这样的原则,即如果(P或Q)在f中是真实的,那么P在f中是真实的,或者Q在f中是真实的这些问题导致一些人,如Routley(1979,10)认为虚构的真理没有统一的逻辑如果Routley是正确的,那么证明f的内容遵守FMP-LOCALf就变得更加困难了(这也解释了为什么我们需要诉诸局部原则,而不是全局原则)。鉴于这些实质性的分歧,在我们对普遍小说的论证中,我们希望避免承诺任何特定的观点,并尽可能少地做出有争议的假设。因此,为了确保(1)和(2)是f的内容的一部分,我们建议在f中包含表达相关命题的显式语句。这是因为,虽然我们认为说并不总是如此,但它通常是这样的。也就是说,如果虚构f包含一个表达命题p的显式陈述,那么,其他条件不变,p在f中为真。因此,包含这些显式陈述是使(1)和(2)成为f内容的一部分的一种相当无争议的方法需要强调的是,我们并不认为这是唯一的方法,只是争议最小的方法。我们在第二个问题上的策略也是统一的。具体来说,我们建议在f的内容中包含一个“无害的”条件句和先行词。总之,这些有力地表明(尽管没有严格限定)相关的推论也是真实的。反过来,这意味着f的内容在FMP-LOCALf下是封闭的。否认这一结局就需要否认结果的虚构真相,这是“完全难以置信的”(2017,78)。 例如,在我们的《不可能先生》中,我们包括:(i)如果不可能先生是国王的火枪手,那么他为国王工作;(ii)不可能先生是火枪手的一员;直观的结果是(iii)不可能的先生为国王工作也是虚构的。这强烈地表明,不可能先生在FMP-LOCALMI下是封闭的,因为否认这一点似乎需要否认(iii)的(极其可信的)虚构真理。和以前一样,我们不认为这是保证FMP-LOCALf对f为真的唯一方法,但我们相信,这是一种相当无争议的方法,与关于虚构真理逻辑的各种观点兼容。我们将首先承认,这两种解决方案都不是无可争议的(什么哲学论证是无可争议的?)这些策略也不是解决这两个问题的唯一途径。但对于上述两个潜在的一般性问题,它们可能是最好的答案,而不是提供深刻而有争议的答案。如果一个人有一个完整的故事,关于虚构真理的充分必要条件,以及虚构真理的逻辑,那么你可能会做得更好。然而,这并不是我们的目标。我们想要创造出一种能够在理论上保持中立的通用小说。背景讨论结束后,我们转向里克桑的反对意见。作为回答,我们提供了一些“无害的”条件句和先行句不一致的例子,尽管结果句相当平凡。例如,我们的《Clara’s Crazy Caper》(2017,78)包含了条件句(i),如果正好吃了三根胡萝卜而不是恰好吃了三根胡萝卜,那么就已经吃了一些胡萝卜,以及矛盾句(ii),正好吃了三根胡萝卜而不是恰好吃了三根胡萝卜。和前面一样,我们非常直观地认为,在这种设置下,这使得(iii)一些胡萝卜被消耗掉是真正的ccc。因此,同样的论点适用:要么反对者同意结果是小说内容的一部分,在这种情况下,他们必须接受内容受不受限制的FMP-LOCALCCC管辖,要么他们必须接受“完全不可信”的结果,即(iii)在ccc中不真实。这至少使反对者承担举证责任。在这里,里克桑德反对说,“不清楚为什么这个例子……会给反对者带来问题。”如果反对意见“包括断然否认当[先行词]不一致时,FMP-LOCAL的实例可以是虚构的真实的,那么提供另一个[先行词]不一致的例子就很难构成反对意见,因为这是反对者不会接受的那种情况”(2020,236)。作为回答,首先要注意的是,问题不在于FMP-LOCAL的实例是否为虚构的真;重要的是它是否真实,而不是在相关的小说中。相反,Ricksand的反对者必须“断然否认”任何条件和相关的不一致先行词的虚构真理的实例都需要虚构的结果真理。这种断然否认看起来极难维持。例如,假设(i) ((P&P)→((P&P) &Q)), (ii) (P&P)和(iii) Q都是真在f。因为(i)和(ii)自相矛盾而否认(iii)在f中为真看起来很荒谬。然而,这正是里克桑的反对者所致力于的。至少,这个反对者承担了举证的责任,来解释为什么我们应该接受这个强烈违反直觉的结果。而且,在此之前,我们有足够的理由认为f在FMP-LOCALf下是关闭的。瑞克桑的第二个反对意见与我们对另一种通用小说配方的讨论有关根据这种说法,一个人可以通过讲一个明确包含诸如“一切都是真的”这样的陈述的故事来制造一个普遍的虚构。这意味着每个命题都是真实的。我们对这种替代配方有很大的担忧(2017,74 - 75)。我们通过一个类比来说明我们的担忧:“每个人都是奸诈的”是真实的,例如,歌剧并不意味着“奥巴马是奸诈的”是真实的。这似乎是因为,“每个人”这个量词只适用于故事中的角色,而不是每个人都是《三便士》剧组的一部分。类似地,“一切都是真的”在f*中为真并不意味着绝对每个命题在f*中都为真,这似乎是合理的。这是因为,似乎,“一切”量词只适用于那些事实上在f*中为真的命题,而不是每个命题都是f*内容的一部分。因此,我们认为最好“避开[这条]路线,为通用小说提供不同的途径”(2017,75)。里克桑的第二个反对意见是,我们对替代配方的担忧同样适用于我们自己的配方。 简而言之,为什么认为爆炸原理中的量词具有普遍的范围,而其他故事中的“万物”则是有限的?除了明显破坏我们的配方外,Ricksand认为这证明了FMP的“琐碎”。这是因为我们“承认[FMP]并不是在所有的小说中都必然地获得,而且它只是FMP的一个局部版本,它允许构建一个普遍的小说,因为为了获得,必须明确地提出使小说具有普遍意义的必要原则。”然而,通过承认没有一个版本的FMP没有明确的声明来达到这个效果,他们也无意中破坏了他们自己的批评”(Ricksand 2020, 236)。首先,问题是让FMP-LOCAL为真,而不是在相关小说中为真——我们希望内容在原则下封闭,而不是让原则成为内容的一部分。其次,如果FMP在某些(而不是所有)小说中成立,就很难看出它是“微不足道的”。第三,我们不承认没有一个版本的FMP是在没有明确声明的情况下获得的。我们对FMP-LOCALf的论证不涉及这样的陈述,而且,坦率地说,我们甚至不知道人们可以做出什么样的明确声明,这将有任何用处。“FMP-LOCALf管理f的内容”是f的主要内容的一部分,明确的内容必然意味着“FMP-LOCALf管理f的内容”是真实的。但是,这并不意味着FMP-LOCALf实际上控制了f的内容,这才是这里的问题所在。10把这些放在一边,认为“一切都是真的”量词是受限制的,而我们的爆炸量词是不受限制的一个原因是,如果不诉诸作者规定之类的东西,就没有办法确保前者的相关范围,这一点是该配方的一位倡导者欣然承认的(Deutsch 1985, 209n16)。相反,爆炸量词被假定为绝对不受限制的,因为在讨论爆炸时,逻辑学家几乎普遍接受它是如此所以,我们不需要做任何事情来使它不受限制——它是现成的——但替代配方必须依赖于规定。鉴于关于作者规定的局限性的实质性辩论,我们认为这是有问题的。这并不是说另一种方法一定会失败——事实上,我们从来没有说过这样的话!相反,我们认为最好避免纠结于这些关于作者意图的“棘手问题”(2017,75),以支持我们的方法。第二个区别是,人们可以把爆炸原理看作是一个推导或推理规则(例如,从一个真正的矛盾中,人们可以推导/推断出任何命题)。这种“生成性”的理解符合我们创作普遍小说的方法:假设相关小说的内容包括矛盾和爆炸原理,那么人们就可以使用这种组合来推导/推断小说中的每一个命题此外,它似乎不受限于量化范围的担忧。然而,没有办法非定量地理解“一切都是真的”的说法。因此,任何依赖于它的配方都会受到担忧的影响。由于我们的方法可能会避免它,这看起来是对它有利的另一点。这些表明,我们的配方和“一切都是真的”的替代方案之间存在着实质性的差异,这足以削弱里克桑的第二个反对意见。首先,需要澄清一点:任何人都不应该认为,在虚构的语句中加入“q是虚构的真实”就足以使q在f中为真。“q在f中为真”意味着,在f中,q在某些虚构中为真,这些虚构可能是f,也可能不是f。同时,q在f中为真意味着,在f中,q为真。而且,很明显,前者并不引申后者据推测,Ricksand的意思是在虚构中包含“q为真”的陈述足以使q在f中为真。所以,我们直接回答这个经过适当修改的困境。我们很高兴拒绝第一个号角。我们不认为明确地陈述q(在相关文本中)足以使q在f中为真。(尽管值得再次强调的是,我们的配方要求FMP-LOCALf是真实的,而不是虚构的)14然而,与Ricksand相反,拒绝(明确的)说法使其如此的观点并不意味着“某些命题不能仅通过明确陈述而在虚构中为真”(2020,237)。它确实意味着,一些试图通过显式陈述使某些命题虚构为真的尝试失败了。但这并不意味着,对于某个特定的命题,通过明确的包容使其虚构为真的每一次尝试都必须失败。这种非蕴涵性足以削弱这种困境的第二个号角。所以,瑞克桑德的困境也不是威胁。总的结论是,瑞克桑德的反对意见并不会威胁到我们创作普世小说的秘诀。 无论如何,思考它们有助于澄清一些要点。因此,我们感谢他参与我们的工作。最后,作为总结,我们想要反映我们之前的结局:即使我们没有说服每个人,普遍的小说是可能的,我们认为强调必须采取哪些行动来接受或拒绝这种可能性本身就是有趣的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Defending Explosive Universal Fictions

We think FMP is false, as not every fiction is closed under conditional elimination.

If you achieve both steps, then, because (2) is a conditional and (1) is its antecedent, f's closure under FMP-LOCALf ensures that the consequent is also true-in-f. And since the consequent is that every proposition is true, it follows that f is a universal fiction.

Ricksand (2020) raises three objections to our proposal. Here, we take the opportunity to reply to these concerns, thereby clarifying and expanding on our argument.

Before turning to Ricksand's objections, it is useful to discuss the background dialectic. Doing so will clarify our ecumenical approach and serve as a foundation for our replies.

There are (at least!) two substantive difficulties one faces when following our recipe. The first concerns ensuring that (1) and (2) are part of f's content. Addressing this requires saying something about the broader question of how to make a particular proposition true in a given fiction.

This is a hoary, difficult matter, to which there is no straightforward answer. One naïve idea is that saying makes it so; roughly, if some statement is explicitly made in a fiction (for example, by the fiction's narrator), then the expressed proposition is true in that fiction. Philosophers and literary theorists have roundly (and rightly) rejected this stipulatory account, as, for example, any fiction featuring an unreliable narrator is a counterexample. A second, related notion is intentionalism: if the (or an) author of fiction f intends that p is true-in-f, then p is true-in-f. This approach has also been largely rejected, running into numerous apparent counterexamples (see, for example, Lewis 1978, though see also, Stock 2017).

Another way of being part of f's content is to be imported, that is, a proposition brought into the fiction from the outside. However, what (if any) propositions should be imported is another controversial matter.3 Yet another way is to be implied; that is, if p is a logical consequence of some proposition that is true-in-f, then p is true-in-f. This is especially unhelpful, since not only does it move the bubble in the carpet (since it requires that we already know some of f's content), but it is not clear which notion of logical consequence we should employ.

We mention these to highlight that there is no good general story about how to guarantee that a proposition is true in particular fiction. This makes addressing the first issue extremely difficult, as it is hard to know whether one has succeeded in making (1) and (2) true in f.4

The second difficulty concerns ensuring that f is governed by FMP-LOCALf. As before, there is a lurking larger problem: namely, settling what (if any) principles constitute the logic of fictional truth. At least at first glance, not all fictions’ content obeys the same logical principles. For example, Priest's Sylvan's Box and Bradbury's A Sound of Thunder are inconsistent, yet their content is not governed by the principle of explosion (otherwise, they would be universal too). Similarly, essentially incomplete fictions like Blade Runner seem to violate the principle that, if (P or Q) is true-in-f, then P is true-in-f or Q is true-in-f.5 These issues have led some, such as Routley (1979, 10) to hold that there is no uniform logic of fictional truth.6 If Routley is correct, then proving that f's content obeys FMP-LOCALf becomes that much harder (and explains why we need to appeal to local, rather than global principles).

In light of these substantive disagreements, in our argument for universal fictions, we wanted to avoid committing to any specific view and make as few controversial assumptions as possible. So, to ensure that (1) and (2) are part of f's content, we suggested including explicit statements in f that expressed the relevant propositions. This is because, while we think that saying does not always make it so, it generally does. That is, if fiction f includes an explicit statement that expresses a proposition p, then, ceteris paribus, p is true-in-f. Consequently, including these explicit statements is a fairly uncontroversial way of getting (1) and (2) to be part of f's content.7 To stress, we do not think this is the only way of doing this, just the least controversial way.

Our strategy concerning the second issue was also ecumenical. Specifically, we suggested including an “innocuous” conditional and antecedent as part of f's content. Together, these strongly suggest (though do not strictly entail) that the relevant consequent is also true-in-f. In turn, this means that f's content is closed under FMP-LOCALf. And denying this closure would require denying the fictional truth of the consequent, which is “utterly implausible” (2017, 78). For example, in our Monsieur Impossible, we included that (i) if Monsieur Impossible is a member of the King's Musketeers, then he works for the King, and that (ii) Monsieur Impossible is a member of the Musketeers; the intuitive result is that (iii) Monsieur Impossible works for the King is also fictionally true. This strongly suggests that Monsieur Impossible is closed under FMP-LOCALMI, as denying this would seem to require denying the (extremely plausible) fictional truth of (iii). As before, we do not think this is the only way to guarantee that FMP-LOCALf is true of f, but is, we believe, a fairly uncontroversial method, compatible with a wide variety of views about the logic of fictional truth.

We would be the first to admit that neither of these solutions are indisputable (what philosophical arguments are?). Nor are these strategies the only way to resolve these two issues. But they are likely the best one can do without providing deep and controversial answers to the two lurking general questions outlined above. If one has a completely worked out story about the necessary and sufficient conditions for fictional truth as well as an account of the logic of fictional truth, then you could probably do better. Yet that was not our goal. We wanted to sketch a recipe for generating universal fictions that was as theory neutral as possible.

With this background discussion out of the way, we turn to Ricksand's objections.

In reply, we offered cases where the “innocuous” conditional and antecedent are inconsistent, though the consequent is suitably mundane. For example, our Clara's Crazy Caper (2017, 78) included the conditional (i) if exactly three and not exactly three carrots are consumed, then some carrots have been consumed, as well as the contradiction (ii) exactly three and not exactly three carrots are consumed. As before, it is strongly intuitive that, given this setup, this makes (iii) some carrots have been consumed is true-in-CCC. Thus, the same argument applies: either the objector grants that the consequence is part of the fiction's content, in which case they must accept that the content is governed by the unrestricted FMP-LOCALCCC, or they have to take on the “utterly implausible” consequence that (iii) is not true-in-CCC. At minimum, this places the burden of proof on the objector.

Here, Ricksand objects that, “it is not clear why this example… would pose a problem to an objector.” If the objection “consists of categorically denying that instances of FMP-LOCAL can be fictionally true when [the antecedent] is inconsistent, it hardly amounts to a counterargument to provide another example … where [the antecedent] is inconsistent, since this is the very kind of case the objector will not accept” (2020, 236).

In reply, first note that the issue is not whether an instance of FMP-LOCAL is fictionally true; what matters is whether it is true of, not in the relevant fiction. Rather, Ricksand's objector must “categorically deny” that any instance of the fictional truth of both a conditional and the relevant inconsistent antecedent entails the fictional truth of the consequent. This categorical denial looks extremely difficult to maintain. For example, suppose that (i) ((P&P) → ((P&P) & Q)), (ii) (P&P), and (iii) Q are all true-in-f. Denying that (iii) is true-in-f because (i) and (ii) feature a contradiction looks ridiculous. Yet, this is what Ricksand's objector is committed to. At minimum, this objector bears the burden of proof of explaining why we should accept this strongly counterintuitive result. And, until this is forthcoming, we have enough to warrant thinking that f is closed under FMP-LOCALf.

Ricksand's second objection concerns our discussion of an alternative universal fiction recipe.8 Per this alternative, one can produce a universal fiction f* by telling a story that explicitly includes some statement like, “everything is true.”9 This is meant to entail that every proposition is true-in-f*.

We have significant worries about this alternative recipe (2017, 74–75). We illustrated our worries via an analogy: that “everyone is treacherous” is true-in-Threepenny-Opera does not entail that, for example, “Obama is treacherous” is true-in-Threepenny. This is because, plausibly, the “everyone” quantifier only ranges over characters in the story, and not every individual is part of Threepenny's cast. Similarly, it is plausible that “everything is true” being true-in-f* does not entail that absolutely every proposition is true-in-f*. This is because, plausibly, the “everything” quantifier only ranges over those propositions that are in fact true-in-f*, and not every proposition is part of f*’s content. So, we think it is best to “sidestep [this] route and offer a different pathway to universal fictions” (2017, 75).

Ricksand's second objection is that our worries about the alternative recipe apply equally to our own. In brief, why think that the quantifier in the principle of explosion has a universal range, while the “everything” in these other stories is restricted?

As well as apparently undermining our recipe, Ricksand suggests that this demonstrates the “triviality” of FMP. This is because we “concede that [FMP does] not obtain with necessity in all fictions, and that it is only a local version of FMP which allows for the construction of a universal fiction, since the principles necessary for rendering a fiction universal must be presented explicitly in order to obtain. However, by conceding that no version of FMP obtains without explicit statements to that effect they also inadvertently undermine their own criticism” (Ricksand 2020, 236).

First, the issue is to have FMP-LOCAL be true of, not true in the relevant fiction—we want the content to be closed under the principle, not for the principle to be part of the content. Second, it is hard to see how FMP is “trivial” if it is true of some but not all fictions. Third, we do not concede that no version of FMP obtains without some explicit statement that it does so. Our argument for FMP-LOCALf involves no such a statement, and, frankly, we would not even know what sort of explicit claim one could make that would be of any use. “FMP-LOCALf governs f's content” being part of f's primary, explicit content certainly entails that “FMP-LOCALf governs f's content” is true-in-f. But, it does not entail that FMP-LOCALf in fact governs f's content, which is what matters here.10

Setting these aside, one reason for thinking the “Everything is true” quantifier is restricted, while our explosion quantifier is unrestricted is that there is no way to secure the relevant range for the former without appealing to something like authorial stipulation, a point that one advocate of this recipe readily admits (Deutsch 1985, 209n16). In contrast, the explosive quantifier is presumed to be absolutely unrestricted, because, when discussing explosion, logicians nearly universally accept that it is so.11 So, we do not need to do anything to make it unrestricted—it comes ready-made that way—but the alternative recipe must rely upon stipulation. And given the substantive debate about the limitations of authorial stipulation, we think this is problematic. This is not to say that this other method must fail—indeed, we never said anything like that! Rather, we think it is better to avoid getting tangled in these “thorny issues” about authorial intent (2017, 75) in favor of our approach.

A second difference is that one can think of the principle of explosions as a derivation or inference rule (for example, that, from a true contradiction, one can derive/infer any proposition). This “generative” understanding fits with our recipe for generating universal fictions: assuming that the relevant fiction's content includes a contradiction and the principle of explosion, one can then use this combination to derive/infer every proposition within the fiction.12 Further, it does not seem subject to the restricted quantification range worry. However, there is no way to understand the “Everything is true” claim nonquantificationally. Thus, any recipe that relies upon it is subject to the worry. Since our approach potentially avoids it, this looks like another point in its favor.

These indicate that there is a substantive difference between our recipe and the “everything is true” alternative, which suffices to undercut Ricksand's second objection.

First, a point of clarification: no one should accept that including in fiction f the statement, “q is fictionally true” is enough to make q true-in-f. That “q is fictionally true” is true-in-f means that, in f, q is true in some fiction, which may or may not be f. Meanwhile, q's being true-in-f means that, in f, q. And, obviously, the former does not entail the latter.13 Presumably, Ricksand meant that including in fiction f the statement that “q is true” is enough to make q true-in-f. So, we direct our reply to this suitably modified version of the dilemma.

We are happy to reject the first horn. We do not think that explicitly stating that q (in the relevant text) is sufficient to make q true-in-f. (Though it is worth stressing again that our recipe requires that FMP-LOCALf be true of and not in fiction f.)14

However, rejecting the idea that (explicitly) saying makes it so does not, contra Ricksand, entail that “some propositions cannot be fictionally true only by virtue of being explicitly stated” (2020, 237). It does entail that some attempts to make some proposition(s) fictionally true by means of explicit statement fail. But it does not entail that, for some particular proposition, every attempt to make it fictionally true via explicit inclusion must fail. This non-entailment is enough to undermine the dilemma's second horn. So, Ricksand's dilemma is no threat either.15

The general upshot is that Ricksand's objections do not threaten our recipe for universal fictions. Regardless, thinking about them was helpful for clarifying a number of points. For this reason, we thank him for engaging with our work. Finally, to conclude, we would like to mirror our previous ending: even if we have not convinced everyone that universal fictions are possible, we think that highlighting what moves must be made to accept or reject this possibility is interesting in its own right.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
25.00%
发文量
54
期刊介绍: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism publishes current research articles, symposia, special issues, and timely book reviews in aesthetics and the arts. The term aesthetics, in this connection, is understood to include all studies of the arts and related types of experience from a philosophic, scientific, or other theoretical standpoint. The arts are taken to include not only the traditional forms such as music, literature, landscape architecture, dance, painting, architecture, sculpture, and other visual arts, but also more recent additions such as photography, film, earthworks, performance and conceptual art, the crafts and decorative arts, contemporary digital innovations, and other cultural practices, including work and activities in the field of popular culture.
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