采用AES加密的低功耗设备侧信道攻击对策

Nicolás Ruminot-Ahumada, Claudio Valencia-Cordero, Rodrigo Abarzúa-Ortiz
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引用次数: 1

摘要

物联网的发展导致低功耗设备的使用大幅增加,这些设备可能包含敏感信息。这些设备大多没有必要的安全措施来保护它们的信息。因此,本文旨在分析和比较采用128-AES加密的低功耗器件中SCA的对策。在这种情况下,我们分析了现有的对抗措施,得出基于算法的对抗措施更适合于低功耗设备的结论。随后,我们运行一组测试,以了解CPA攻击的范围,从而建立针对这些设备的对策。最后,我们提出了一种基于字节逻辑的对策,并与传统的同类型对策进行了比较。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Side Channel Attack Countermeasure for Low Power Devices with AES Encryption
The advancement of Internet of Things produces a massive increase in the use of low-power devices, which can contain sensitive information. Most of these devices do not have the necessary security to protect their information. Therefore, the work aims is analyze and compare countermeasures for SCA in low-power devices with 128-AES encryption. In this scenario, we analyze existing countermeasures and conclude that algorithm-based countermeasures are more suitable for low-power devices. Subsequently, we run a set of tests to understand the scope of CPA attacks and thus establish a countermeasure that is tailored to these devices. Finally, we propose a countermeasure based on byte logic, comparing it with traditional countermeasures of the same type.
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