地方绩效评估能改善治理吗?证据来自越南的实地实验

Edmund J. Malesky, Tuan-Ngoc Phan, A. Q. Le
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引用次数: 1

摘要

目的一党制政体越来越多地使用次国家绩效评估(SPAs)——对各省和地区进行排名——来改善治理成果。公共服务机构收集和公布有关地方政府绩效的信息,以促进监督和官员之间的竞争。然而,关于它们在这方面的影响的证据很少。作者认为,中央集权的一党制国家的内在激励结构扭曲了spa的积极影响。设计/方法/方法越南省级治理和公共行政绩效指数(PAPI)的交错推出创造了一个自然的实验。由于2010年的预算限制,PAPI的第一次调查只覆盖了越南63个省份中的30个,2011年覆盖了所有省份。PAPI团队使用匹配程序为每个省确定一个统计双胞胎,然后从每对中随机选择一个。作者使用随机推理来比较2011年这些对照组和治疗组的结果。接触PAPI有助于改善治理的几乎所有方面;然而,存在优先级偏见的重要证据。这种积极影响只在行政程序方面持续存在,这是当时中央政府优先考虑的治理领域之一。其他维度只显示出短期影响。原创性/价值我们的研究考察了spa在一党制背景下的影响。此外,作者利用自然实验来确定信息效应的因果关系。作者还研究了过去的短期效果,以比较治疗后5年的结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Do subnational performance assessments lead to improved governance? Evidence from a field experiment in Vietnam
PurposeSingle-party regimes increasingly use Subnational Performance Assessments (SPAs) – rankings of provinces and districts – to improve governance outcomes. SPAs assemble and publicize information on local government performance to facilitate monitoring and generate competition among officials. However, the evidence are sparse on their effects in this context. The authors argue that built-in incentive structures in centralized single-party regimes distort the positive impact of SPAs.Design/methodology/approachThe staggered rollout of the Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) created a natural experiment. Due to 2010 budget constraints, the first iteration of the PAPI survey covered only 30 of Vietnam’s 63 provinces before covering all in 2011. The PAPI team used matching procedures to identify a statistical twin for each province before randomly selecting one from each pair. The authors use randomization inference to compare the outcomes of these control and treatment groups in 2011.FindingsExposure to PAPI helped improve almost all aspects of governance; however, significant evidence of prioritization bias exist. The positive effects only persisted for the dimension of administrative procedures, which was the one area of governance that was prioritized by the central government at the time. Other dimensions only registered short-term effects.Originality/valueOur study provides an examination of the impact of SPAs in a single-party regime context. In addition, the authors leverage the natural experiment to identify information effects causally. The authors also look past short-term effects to compare outcomes for five years after the treatment occurred.
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