{"title":"从可信的规范到实现映射的编码","authors":"W. D. Young, J. McHugh","doi":"10.1109/SP.1987.10003","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract: One criterion for \"Beyond Al\" certification according to the DoD Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria will be code-level verification. We argue that, while verification at the actual code level may be infeasible for large secure systems, it is possible to push the verification to a low level of abstraction and then map the specification in an intuitive manner to the source code. Providing a suitable mapping requires adhering to a strict discipline on both the specification and code sides. We discuss the issues involved in this problem, particularizing the discussion to a mapping from Gypsy specifications to C code.","PeriodicalId":123213,"journal":{"name":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","volume":"56 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1987-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"26","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Coding for a Believable Specification to Implementation Mapping\",\"authors\":\"W. D. Young, J. McHugh\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/SP.1987.10003\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract: One criterion for \\\"Beyond Al\\\" certification according to the DoD Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria will be code-level verification. We argue that, while verification at the actual code level may be infeasible for large secure systems, it is possible to push the verification to a low level of abstraction and then map the specification in an intuitive manner to the source code. Providing a suitable mapping requires adhering to a strict discipline on both the specification and code sides. We discuss the issues involved in this problem, particularizing the discussion to a mapping from Gypsy specifications to C code.\",\"PeriodicalId\":123213,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy\",\"volume\":\"56 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1987-04-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"26\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10003\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"1987 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.1987.10003","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Coding for a Believable Specification to Implementation Mapping
Abstract: One criterion for "Beyond Al" certification according to the DoD Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria will be code-level verification. We argue that, while verification at the actual code level may be infeasible for large secure systems, it is possible to push the verification to a low level of abstraction and then map the specification in an intuitive manner to the source code. Providing a suitable mapping requires adhering to a strict discipline on both the specification and code sides. We discuss the issues involved in this problem, particularizing the discussion to a mapping from Gypsy specifications to C code.
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