合作、冲突和现代美联储的出现

Owen F. Humpage
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引用次数: 2

摘要

联邦储备系统是一个独立的中央银行的典范,它有权抵制政治压力,并为国家的长期最佳经济利益而行动。但情况并非总是如此。在过去(不太遥远的过去),美国的货币政策常常屈从于政府的其他要求。即使对现代的美联储来说,独立性也是一个微妙、多变、最终也很脆弱的概念,但维持独立性至关重要。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cooperation, Conflict, and the Emergence of a Modern Federal Reserve
The Federal Reserve System is a model of an independent central bank, with the authority to resist political pressure and act in the long-term best economic interest of the country. But this has not always been the case. In the past—and not too distant past at that—US monetary policy has frequently yielded to other governmental requirements. Even for the modern Federal Reserve, independence is a nuanced, mutable and, ultimately, fragile concept, but one that is essential to maintain.
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