{"title":"假名声明在机制设计中的作用:面向互联网集体决策","authors":"M. Yokoo, Y. Sakurai, S. Matsubara","doi":"10.1109/ICDCS.2000.840916","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this paper is to analyze a collective decision making problem in an open, dynamic environment, such as the Internet. More specifically, we study a class of mechanism design problems where the designer of a mechanism cannot completely identify the participants (agents) of the mechanism. A typical example of such a situation is Internet auctions. The main contributions of this paper are as follows. We develop a formal model of a mechanism design problem in which false-name declarations are possible, and prove that the revelation principle still holds in this model. When false-name declarations and hiding are possible, we show that there exists no auction protocol that achieves Pareto efficient allocations in a dominant strategy equilibrium for all cases. We show a sufficient condition where the Clarke mechanism is robust against false-name declarations (the concavity of the maximal total utility of agents).","PeriodicalId":284992,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 20th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems","volume":"139 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2000-04-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"59","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The effect of false-name declarations in mechanism design: towards collective decision making on the Internet\",\"authors\":\"M. Yokoo, Y. Sakurai, S. Matsubara\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/ICDCS.2000.840916\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The purpose of this paper is to analyze a collective decision making problem in an open, dynamic environment, such as the Internet. More specifically, we study a class of mechanism design problems where the designer of a mechanism cannot completely identify the participants (agents) of the mechanism. A typical example of such a situation is Internet auctions. The main contributions of this paper are as follows. We develop a formal model of a mechanism design problem in which false-name declarations are possible, and prove that the revelation principle still holds in this model. When false-name declarations and hiding are possible, we show that there exists no auction protocol that achieves Pareto efficient allocations in a dominant strategy equilibrium for all cases. We show a sufficient condition where the Clarke mechanism is robust against false-name declarations (the concavity of the maximal total utility of agents).\",\"PeriodicalId\":284992,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings 20th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems\",\"volume\":\"139 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2000-04-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"59\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings 20th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2000.840916\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings 20th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICDCS.2000.840916","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The effect of false-name declarations in mechanism design: towards collective decision making on the Internet
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a collective decision making problem in an open, dynamic environment, such as the Internet. More specifically, we study a class of mechanism design problems where the designer of a mechanism cannot completely identify the participants (agents) of the mechanism. A typical example of such a situation is Internet auctions. The main contributions of this paper are as follows. We develop a formal model of a mechanism design problem in which false-name declarations are possible, and prove that the revelation principle still holds in this model. When false-name declarations and hiding are possible, we show that there exists no auction protocol that achieves Pareto efficient allocations in a dominant strategy equilibrium for all cases. We show a sufficient condition where the Clarke mechanism is robust against false-name declarations (the concavity of the maximal total utility of agents).