参议院阻挠议事:破坏政治

E. Bondurant
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Part I traces the history of the filibuster, documents the recent surge in filibusters and explains why the rules of the Senate, including the filibuster rule, cannot be amended by a simple majority vote as can the rules of the House of Representatives. The Senate filibuster rule is responsible for much of the partisan gridlock in Congress, and has replaced majority rule with a tyranny of the minority. The Senate is incapable of reforming its rules for the same reasons that state legislatures and Congress refused to reform of the apportionment of state legislative and congressional districts. If reform is to come, it will not come from within the Senate, and can only come from the courts as occurred in the case of congressional and state legislative districts, the one-house veto, and the line-item veto cases.Part II examines the historical evidence that reveals that there was no “right” of unlimited debate at the time the Constitution was adopted and that the filibuster is nothing more than an unintended consequence of a decision by the Senate to delete the previous question motion from its rules in 1806. That decision was based on the naive assumption that the rule was unnecessary because Senators were gentlemen who would never attempt to obstruct the business of the Senate by abusing the privilege of debate. This Part examines the filibuster in the light of the debates at the Federal Convention, the Federalists Papers and the express language of Article I the Constitution all of which were premised on the democratic principle of majority rule. When the Framers of the Constitution intended to condition action on a vote or more than a simple majority of the House or Senate, they did so expressly in six carefully defined exceptions – and significantly rejected the only proposals at the Federal Convention that would have prohibited a simple majority from passing legislation prior to its presentation to the President. Although defenders of the filibuster argue that the Constitution gives each house the power to make its own rules, this power is not absolute. The Supreme Court ruled over a century ago that this rule-making power does not include the power to adopt rules that violate other provisions of the Constitution. Finally, this Part also argues that Senate Rule V, which provides that the rules of the Senate to continue from one Senate to the next and prohibits the Senate from amending its own rules without a two-thirds vote, is also unconstitutional.In Part III, I confront the skeptics who contend that the federal courts are barred by the separation of powers and the political question doctrines from ruling on the merits of the constitutionality of the rules of the Senate. The Supreme Court ruled in 1892, however, that the question of whether a House rule violated other provisions of the Constitution was a matter for the federal courts. Part III also addresses the issue of standing on which previous challenges to the Senate filibuster rule have foundered. This Part demonstrates that there are a number of potential plaintiffs with standing, including the Vice President, sitting members of the Senate and the House, individuals who would have been direct beneficiaries of measures that passed the House but died in the Senate, presidential appointees whose nominations were denied a confirmation vote as a result of actual or threatened filibusters, and organizations such as Common Cause. These individuals and entities have all been directly injured and would have standing to challenge the Senate filibuster rule. Part III also explains that the courts are fully capable of granting complete relief without “rewriting” the rules of the Senate, simply by the entry of a declaratory judgment declaring the supermajority vote portions of Rule XXII unconstitutional. Part IV address the common arguments espoused in favor of the filibuster, such as the contention that it prevents the passage of hastily adopted legislation, promotes compromise, and prevents the “tyranny of the majority.” I also address the unfounded contentions that “we have always had a filibuster” and “it’s only a rule of procedure.” Lastly, I answer the argument that the “remedial discretion” doctrine, a doctrine unique to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, would doom any legal challenge to the filibuster. The filibuster is unconstitutional. The arguments to the contrary are weak. And the courts have both the power and duty to strike down the Senate Rules that conflict with the Constitution.","PeriodicalId":125020,"journal":{"name":"Political Institutions: Legislatures eJournal","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Senate Filibuster: The Politics of Destruction\",\"authors\":\"E. Bondurant\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1721821\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The notion that the Framers of the Constitution intended to allow a minority in the U.S. Senate to exercise a veto power over legislation and presidential appointments is not only profoundly undemocratic, it is also a myth. 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This Part examines the filibuster in the light of the debates at the Federal Convention, the Federalists Papers and the express language of Article I the Constitution all of which were premised on the democratic principle of majority rule. When the Framers of the Constitution intended to condition action on a vote or more than a simple majority of the House or Senate, they did so expressly in six carefully defined exceptions – and significantly rejected the only proposals at the Federal Convention that would have prohibited a simple majority from passing legislation prior to its presentation to the President. Although defenders of the filibuster argue that the Constitution gives each house the power to make its own rules, this power is not absolute. The Supreme Court ruled over a century ago that this rule-making power does not include the power to adopt rules that violate other provisions of the Constitution. 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引用次数: 2

摘要

有人认为,宪法制定者打算允许美国参议院中的少数人对立法和总统任命行使否决权,这不仅是极不民主的,而且是一个神话。法律评论文章的压倒性趋势假设,由于宪法赋予参众两院制定自己规则的权力,参议院的阻挠议事规则不受宪法攻击。本文基于经常被忽视的阻挠议事的历史、宪法文本和相关的法院先例采取了相反的立场,这些先例表明,参议院阻挠议事规则的合宪性并不像许多人所认为的那样是一个超出联邦法院管辖范围的政治问题。本文分为四个部分。第一部分追溯了阻挠议事的历史,记录了最近阻挠议事的激增,并解释了为什么参议院的规则,包括阻挠议事规则,不能像众议院的规则一样,通过简单多数投票进行修改。参议院的阻挠议事规则是造成国会党派僵局的主要原因,它以少数人的暴政取代了多数人的统治。参议院无法改革其规则,其原因与州立法机构和国会拒绝改革州立法和国会选区的分配相同。如果要进行改革,改革不会来自参议院内部,而只能来自法院,就像国会和州立法区、一院否决和项目否决的情况一样。第二部分考察了历史证据,这些证据表明,在宪法通过的时候,没有无限制辩论的“权利”,而阻挠议事只不过是参议院在1806年从其规则中删除前一个问题动议的决定的意外后果。这一决定是基于一种天真的假设,即该规则是不必要的,因为参议员是绅士,他们永远不会试图通过滥用辩论特权来阻碍参议院的事务。本部分从联邦大会的辩论、《联邦党人文集》和《宪法》第一条的明确语言来考察冗长演说,所有这些都是以多数人统治的民主原则为前提的。当制宪者打算以投票或超过众议院或参议院的简单多数为行动条件时,他们明确地在六个精心定义的例外中这样做了-并且明显拒绝了联邦大会上唯一禁止在向总统提交立法之前以简单多数通过的提案。尽管阻挠议事的捍卫者辩称,宪法赋予两院制定自己规则的权力,但这种权力并非绝对的。最高法院在一个多世纪前裁定,这种制定规则的权力不包括采用违反宪法其他条款的规则的权力。最后,本部分还认为,参议院规则V规定参议院的规则从一个参议院延续到下一个参议院,并禁止参议院在没有三分之二投票的情况下修改自己的规则,这也是违宪的。在第三部分中,我将面对怀疑论者,他们认为联邦法院受到三权分立和政治问题理论的限制,无法对参议院规则的合宪性做出裁决。然而,最高法院在1892年裁定,众议院的裁决是否违反了宪法的其他条款,这是联邦法院的事情。第三部分还讨论了先前对参议院阻挠议事规则的挑战失败的立场问题。这一部分表明,有许多潜在的原告,包括副总统、参众两院的现任议员、众议院通过但在参议院死亡的措施的直接受益者、由于实际或威胁阻挠议事而提名被否决的总统任命者,以及“共同事业”(Common Cause)等组织。这些个人和实体都受到了直接伤害,并有资格挑战参议院的阻挠议事规则。第三部分还解释说,法院完全有能力在不“重写”参议院规则的情况下给予完全的救济,只需作出宣告性判决,宣布规则XXII的绝对多数投票部分违宪。第四部分讨论了支持阻挠议事的常见论点,比如它可以防止匆忙通过的立法,促进妥协,防止“多数人的暴政”。我还谈到了“我们一直有阻挠议事”和“这只是一个程序规则”等毫无根据的论点。 最后,我要回答的论点是,“补偿性自由裁量权”原则是美国特区巡回上诉法院特有的原则,它将使任何对阻挠议事的法律挑战失败。阻挠议事是违宪的。相反的论点是站不住脚的。法院有权力也有义务推翻与宪法相冲突的参议院规则。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Senate Filibuster: The Politics of Destruction
The notion that the Framers of the Constitution intended to allow a minority in the U.S. Senate to exercise a veto power over legislation and presidential appointments is not only profoundly undemocratic, it is also a myth. The overwhelming trend of law review articles have assumed that because the Constitution grants to each house the power to make its own rules, the Senate filibuster rule is immune from constitutional attack. This Article takes an opposite position based on the often overlooked history of the filibuster, the text of the Constitution and the relevant court precedents which demonstrate that the constitutionality of the Senate filibuster rule is not, as many have assumed, a political question that is beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts.This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the history of the filibuster, documents the recent surge in filibusters and explains why the rules of the Senate, including the filibuster rule, cannot be amended by a simple majority vote as can the rules of the House of Representatives. The Senate filibuster rule is responsible for much of the partisan gridlock in Congress, and has replaced majority rule with a tyranny of the minority. The Senate is incapable of reforming its rules for the same reasons that state legislatures and Congress refused to reform of the apportionment of state legislative and congressional districts. If reform is to come, it will not come from within the Senate, and can only come from the courts as occurred in the case of congressional and state legislative districts, the one-house veto, and the line-item veto cases.Part II examines the historical evidence that reveals that there was no “right” of unlimited debate at the time the Constitution was adopted and that the filibuster is nothing more than an unintended consequence of a decision by the Senate to delete the previous question motion from its rules in 1806. That decision was based on the naive assumption that the rule was unnecessary because Senators were gentlemen who would never attempt to obstruct the business of the Senate by abusing the privilege of debate. This Part examines the filibuster in the light of the debates at the Federal Convention, the Federalists Papers and the express language of Article I the Constitution all of which were premised on the democratic principle of majority rule. When the Framers of the Constitution intended to condition action on a vote or more than a simple majority of the House or Senate, they did so expressly in six carefully defined exceptions – and significantly rejected the only proposals at the Federal Convention that would have prohibited a simple majority from passing legislation prior to its presentation to the President. Although defenders of the filibuster argue that the Constitution gives each house the power to make its own rules, this power is not absolute. The Supreme Court ruled over a century ago that this rule-making power does not include the power to adopt rules that violate other provisions of the Constitution. Finally, this Part also argues that Senate Rule V, which provides that the rules of the Senate to continue from one Senate to the next and prohibits the Senate from amending its own rules without a two-thirds vote, is also unconstitutional.In Part III, I confront the skeptics who contend that the federal courts are barred by the separation of powers and the political question doctrines from ruling on the merits of the constitutionality of the rules of the Senate. The Supreme Court ruled in 1892, however, that the question of whether a House rule violated other provisions of the Constitution was a matter for the federal courts. Part III also addresses the issue of standing on which previous challenges to the Senate filibuster rule have foundered. This Part demonstrates that there are a number of potential plaintiffs with standing, including the Vice President, sitting members of the Senate and the House, individuals who would have been direct beneficiaries of measures that passed the House but died in the Senate, presidential appointees whose nominations were denied a confirmation vote as a result of actual or threatened filibusters, and organizations such as Common Cause. These individuals and entities have all been directly injured and would have standing to challenge the Senate filibuster rule. Part III also explains that the courts are fully capable of granting complete relief without “rewriting” the rules of the Senate, simply by the entry of a declaratory judgment declaring the supermajority vote portions of Rule XXII unconstitutional. Part IV address the common arguments espoused in favor of the filibuster, such as the contention that it prevents the passage of hastily adopted legislation, promotes compromise, and prevents the “tyranny of the majority.” I also address the unfounded contentions that “we have always had a filibuster” and “it’s only a rule of procedure.” Lastly, I answer the argument that the “remedial discretion” doctrine, a doctrine unique to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, would doom any legal challenge to the filibuster. The filibuster is unconstitutional. The arguments to the contrary are weak. And the courts have both the power and duty to strike down the Senate Rules that conflict with the Constitution.
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