从沉默的官僚主义到“无证奇迹”:解释印度选举委员会扩大的授权

Amit Ahuja, S. Ostermann
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引用次数: 0

摘要

发展中国家的公共机构往往以机构俘获或腐败为特征。然而,印度选举委员会已经成为该国最强大的监管机构之一。自1952年以来,选举委员会已经监督完成了16次全国和350次州选举。它是印度最著名和最受信任的公共机构之一,享有巨大的权力,并举行了世界上最长的选举。我们使用过程追踪方法来解释欧盟委员会令人惊讶的授权扩张,认为在联邦制民主中:1)当制度约束被削弱时;2)当以国家为基础的行为者要求有能力和中立的仲裁者时;3)当企业家型官僚行为体利用政治机会时,官僚体系中那些能够可靠地满足这些需求的方面就能够成功地扩大其权力。示范守则的实施和选举期限的变化证明了选举委员会更广泛的作用。选举委员会的经验表明,薄弱的行政部门可以促进国家机构的加强,在联邦制下,以州为基础的选举力量可以产生强大的国家机构。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
From Quiescent Bureaucracy to 'Undocumented Wonder': Explaining the Indian Election Commission's Expanding Mandate
Public institutions in the developing world are often characterized by institutional capture or decay. Yet, India’s Election Commission has become one of its most powerful regulatory bodies. The Election Commission has overseen the completion of 16 national and 350 state elections since 1952. It is one of the most widely-celebrated and trusted public institutions in India, enjoys substantial powers, and conducts some of the longest elections in the world. We use a process-tracing approach to explain the EC’s surprising expansion of mandate, arguing that in a federal democracy: 1) when institutional constraints are weakened; 2) when state-based actors demand a competent and neutral arbiter; and 3) when entrepreneurial bureaucratic actors take advantage of moments of political opportunity, those aspects of the bureaucracy that can credibly meet these demands are able to successfully expand their powers. Changes in Model Code Implementation and Election Duration attest to the Election Commission’s broader role. The Election Commission’s experience suggests that a weak executive can facilitate the strengthening of state institutions and that, under federalism, state-based electoral forces can produce strong national institutions.
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