{"title":"具有持久隐藏信息的公开上市选择","authors":"Francesco Celentano, Mark Rempel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3729715","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"How much does firm intangibility amplify CEOs' persistent private information and reduce firms' public listing propensity? We develop a model of competing public and private investors financing firms heterogeneously exposed to persistent private cashflows. Equilibrium financing is driven by information rent differentials in CEO compensation. We validate and structurally estimate the model using firm listing and CEO compensation data. We find private (intangible) cashflows exhibit 63% higher persistence than their tangible counterparts. Further, if firm intangibility levels returned to those of 1980, mean listing propensities would increase 8 percentage points while mean CEO variable pay growth would decrease by 43%.","PeriodicalId":201359,"journal":{"name":"Econometric Modeling: Microeconometric Models of Firm Behavior eJournal","volume":"87 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Public Listing Choice with Persistent Hidden Information\",\"authors\":\"Francesco Celentano, Mark Rempel\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3729715\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"How much does firm intangibility amplify CEOs' persistent private information and reduce firms' public listing propensity? We develop a model of competing public and private investors financing firms heterogeneously exposed to persistent private cashflows. Equilibrium financing is driven by information rent differentials in CEO compensation. We validate and structurally estimate the model using firm listing and CEO compensation data. We find private (intangible) cashflows exhibit 63% higher persistence than their tangible counterparts. Further, if firm intangibility levels returned to those of 1980, mean listing propensities would increase 8 percentage points while mean CEO variable pay growth would decrease by 43%.\",\"PeriodicalId\":201359,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Econometric Modeling: Microeconometric Models of Firm Behavior eJournal\",\"volume\":\"87 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-11-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Econometric Modeling: Microeconometric Models of Firm Behavior eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3729715\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Econometric Modeling: Microeconometric Models of Firm Behavior eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3729715","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Public Listing Choice with Persistent Hidden Information
How much does firm intangibility amplify CEOs' persistent private information and reduce firms' public listing propensity? We develop a model of competing public and private investors financing firms heterogeneously exposed to persistent private cashflows. Equilibrium financing is driven by information rent differentials in CEO compensation. We validate and structurally estimate the model using firm listing and CEO compensation data. We find private (intangible) cashflows exhibit 63% higher persistence than their tangible counterparts. Further, if firm intangibility levels returned to those of 1980, mean listing propensities would increase 8 percentage points while mean CEO variable pay growth would decrease by 43%.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
