缠结:一种增强的逻辑锁定技术,用于挫败SAT和结构攻击

A. Darjani, N. Kavand, Shubham Rai, M. Wijtvliet, Akash Kumar
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引用次数: 5

摘要

在SAT弹性逻辑锁定技术中,剥离功能逻辑锁定(SFLL)是最有前途的解决方案,它可以保护知识产权免受针对点函数技术的近似攻击、敏化攻击、SAT攻击和结构攻击。然而,即使是SFLL技术也被证明容易受到最近一类识别摄动逻辑的结构攻击的攻击。在本文中,我们首先对所有可能的SFLL攻击进行分类。然后,我们提出了一种基于SFLL的新型逻辑锁定技术,可以抵抗所有这些攻击,包括新兴的基于ml的攻击。我们针对公开可用的sll攻击测试了我们的技术。实施结果表明,ENTANGLE可以确保大型工业电路的平均开销,面积和功耗分别为11.6%和9.1%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
ENTANGLE: An Enhanced Logic-locking Technique for Thwarting SAT and Structural Attacks
Among the SAT-resilient logic locking techniques, the Stripped-Functionality-Logic-Locking (SFLL) is the most promising solution which can guard the intellectual property against approximate, sensitization, SAT, and structural attacks which target Point-function techniques. However, even the SFLL technique has been shown to be vulnerable to a recent class of structural attacks that identify the perturbation logic. In this paper, we first categorize all possible classes of attacks on SFLL. Then we propose ENTANGLE a novel logic locking technique built upon SFLL that can resist all of these attacks, including the emerging ML-Based attacks. We test our technique against publicly available SFLL attacks. The implementation results show that ENTANGLE can secure large-sized industrial circuits with an average overhead of 11.6 percent and 9.1 percent for area and power, respectively.
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