大股东隧道效应对高管激励契约的影响

2015 International Conference on Logistics, Informatics and Service Sciences (LISS) Pub Date : 2015-07-27 DOI:10.1109/LISS.2015.7369620

Yuanyuan Sun, Zhongfan Ma, Yanli Shi

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引用次数: 0

摘要

大股东“挖隧道”行为会影响高管激励契约。我们将高管激励分为显性薪酬激励和隐性薪酬激励。2008-2013年中国上市公司数据显示，隧道效应导致高管薪酬绩效敏感性下降。此外，隧道也会导致与位置相关的消耗显著增加。结果表明，隧道效应降低了高管激励契约的有效性。

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Effects of large shareholders' tunneling on executive incentive contract

Large shareholders' tunneling can affect executive incentive contracts. We divide the executive incentive into explicit compensation and implicit incentive. Data from publicly listed companies in China during 2008-2013 shows that tunneling leads to decline in executive pay-performance sensitivity. In addition, tunneling also leads to significant increases in position-related consumption. The results indicate that tunneling reduces the effectiveness of executive incentive contracts.

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2015 International Conference on Logistics, Informatics and Service Sciences (LISS)

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