{"title":"不情愿的监管","authors":"Bernardo Bortolotti, C. Cambini, Laura Rondi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2046912","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study the effect of state ownership on the market-to-book ratios of publicly traded European utilities observed from 1994 to 2005. We find that when the company is subject to independent regulation, state ownership is positively associated with firm value. This effect is strong and significant in countries where weak checks and balances and political fragmentation do not constrain the power of the executive. We conclude that where political institutions are weak, politicians imperfectly delegate powers to regulatory agencies in order to benefit state-owned firms.","PeriodicalId":300963,"journal":{"name":"Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Research Paper Series","volume":"7 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"25","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Reluctant Regulation\",\"authors\":\"Bernardo Bortolotti, C. Cambini, Laura Rondi\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.2046912\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study the effect of state ownership on the market-to-book ratios of publicly traded European utilities observed from 1994 to 2005. We find that when the company is subject to independent regulation, state ownership is positively associated with firm value. This effect is strong and significant in countries where weak checks and balances and political fragmentation do not constrain the power of the executive. We conclude that where political institutions are weak, politicians imperfectly delegate powers to regulatory agencies in order to benefit state-owned firms.\",\"PeriodicalId\":300963,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Research Paper Series\",\"volume\":\"7 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-04-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"25\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Research Paper Series\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2046912\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) Research Paper Series","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2046912","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the effect of state ownership on the market-to-book ratios of publicly traded European utilities observed from 1994 to 2005. We find that when the company is subject to independent regulation, state ownership is positively associated with firm value. This effect is strong and significant in countries where weak checks and balances and political fragmentation do not constrain the power of the executive. We conclude that where political institutions are weak, politicians imperfectly delegate powers to regulatory agencies in order to benefit state-owned firms.
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