任意数量目标分配问题中最小价格Walrasian规则的刻画

ERN: Equity Pub Date : 2021-06-02 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3859893

R. Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa

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引用次数: 1

摘要

研究了具有货币转移的多目标分配问题，其中每个主体最多获得一个目标(单位需求)。我们关注满足个体理性、无补贴、效率和策略验证的分配规则。扩展了Morimoto和Serizawa(2015)的结果，我们证明了对于任意数量的代理和对象，最小价格瓦尔拉斯在经典域上具有四个性质。

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A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.

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ERN: Equity

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