俄罗斯对美政策

N. Koizumi
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在苏联解体后的10年里,俄罗斯已经成为一个中产阶级大国,而美国作为唯一的超级大国,在国际舞台上越来越倾向于我行我势。俄罗斯是如何应对美国的?这个问题与一个更广泛的问题密切相关,即俄罗斯在国际关系体系变革中如何适应。本文试图通过论述战略稳定问题来回答这个问题。在冷战体系下,美苏之间的战略稳定是通过双方都承诺不发展和部署防御性核武器来控制进攻性核武器来实现的。但自冷战结束以来,核扩散已被视为更大的威胁,这促使美国发展国家导弹防御系统(NMD)。因此,俄罗斯希望维持原有的战略稳定,而美国则希望发展国家导弹防御系统。双方开始了谈判。首先,我们分析了俄罗斯在核武器谈判中的行为和各方的意图,并特别强调了军事改革的论点。在文章的后半部分,我们考察了俄罗斯对核不扩散问题的态度。这次我们重点介绍了军工联合体的情况及其重建过程,以及专家们对此事的看法。我们将从冷战结束到2001年9月11日进行分析。我们停留在9月11日的原因是为了表明,俄罗斯并没有在9月11日突然改变。作为结论,我们认为,首先,俄罗斯最初试图维持旧的战略稳定,但由于其财政限制和军事改革的迫切需要,这是不可能的。普京总统通过放弃之前与美国保持战略均势的目标,慢慢地开始停止俄罗斯假装超级大国的做法。2001年9月11日,他抓住机会,决定在美国主导的新国际体系中成为一个大国。其次,当涉及到新的威胁核扩散时,俄罗斯也迟迟没有认识到它的重要性,因为其庞大的军事工业需要出口军用武器才能生存。我们发现,在努力确保美国不扩散承诺的同时,俄罗斯也在试图向伊朗这样的“流氓国家”出售更多武器。但现在,美国无法阻止自己的这些承诺。战略稳定/START/NMD/核不扩散/伊朗
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Russian Policy Toward the United States
During 10 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has become a middle-class power, while the United States as the only superpower is increasingly inclined to behave on its own way in the international scene. How is Russia trying to cope with the US? This question is closely related to a broader issue, i.e. how Russia is making its adaptation during the system change of international relations.This article attempts to answer this question by addressing itself to the issue of strategic stability. Under the Cold War system the strategic stability between the US and the Soviet Union was attained by controlling offensive nuclear weapons with defensive nuclear weapons promised not to develop and deploy by both sides. But since the end of the Cold War, nuclear proliferation has become perceived bigger threats, which pushed the US to the development of the National Missile Defense (NMD) . Thus Russia wants to maintain the old strategic stability, while the US wants to develop the NMD. The negotiation started between the two.First we analyze Russian behavior in the nuclear arms negotiation and the intention of various actors with the specific emphasis on the arguments on the military reform. Then at the latter half of the article we examine Russian attitude toward the issue of non-proliferation problems. This time we focus on the situation of military industrial complex and its reconstruction process, and also the specialists' arguments on the matter. We will analyze them from the end of the Cold War until September 11, 2001. The reason why we stop at September 11 is to show that Russia did not suddenly change on September 11.As conclusions we argue that first, Russia initially tried to maintain the old strategic stability but it turned out to be impossible to do so because of her financial constraints and the urgent need for military reform. President Putin slowly began to stop Russia's pretending a superpower by renouncing his previous goal to maintain the strategic parity with the US. Then, on September 11, 2001, he grasped at the chance and decided to become a big power in the new US-led international system.Second, when it comes to a new threat, nuclear proliferation, Russia was also slow to recognize its significance because its huge military industry needs to export military weapons in order to survive. And we find that while making efforts to secure the US non-proliferation commitments, Russia is also trying to sell more weapons to even the 'rouge nations' like Iran. But now the US can't stop those commitments for its Key words; strategic stability/START/NMD/nuclear non-proliferation/Iran
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