当管理者计划谈判而不是合伙人会发生什么?

Susan A. McCracken, Steven E. Salterio, Regan N. Schmidt
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引用次数: 3

摘要

大多数严重的审计客户管理(ACM)谈判发生在审计合伙人和高级客户管理人员之间。研究还表明,审计经理经常试图与客户管理解决问题的几个原因,包括效率。先前的谈判研究在其他环境和会计表明,如果合作伙伴采用不同的策略比管理者,会产生不同的谈判结果。因此,考虑到ACM谈判对最终财务报表的重要性,了解合伙人与管理者的预期战略使用是很重要的。此外,一般谈判研究提供了相互矛盾的预测,当经验水平与权力/地位不同时,将计划使用哪种综合策略,合作伙伴和管理者的确切情况。我们发现,在使用一种策略,共同合作解决问题时,合作伙伴和管理人员打算以同样的方式进行谈判;但对于另一种策略,考虑到其他潜在的问题,他们的预期策略使用是不同的。专注于预期分配(输赢)策略的使用,我们发现,虽然权力/地位和经验谈判研究预测表明,合作伙伴和管理者都应该以相同的方式使用这些策略,但我们的结果显示了会计情境的特定使用。我们发现,如果经验和权力/地位问题与背景相互作用,合伙人和经理有意分配战略的使用与会计背景的重要因素相互作用,这些因素无法预测,超出了它们存在的一般可能性。讨论了对实践和研究的启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
What Happens When Managers Plan Negotiations Instead of Partners?
Most serious auditor client management (ACM) negotiations occur between audit partners and senior client management. Research also shows that audit managers often attempt to resolve issues with client management for several reasons, including efficiency. Prior negotiation research in other settings as well as accounting suggests that if partners employ different strategies than managers, different negotiation outcomes will occur. Thus, given the importance of ACM negotiation to the resulting financial statements, an understanding of the intended strategy usage of partners versus managers is important. Further, generic negotiation research provides conflicting predictions about which integrative strategies would be planned to be used when experience level versus power/status differs, the exact situation of partners and managers. We find that in the use of one strategy, working together on solving the issue cooperatively, partners and managers intend to approach negotiations the same way; but that for another strategy, bringing other potential issues into consideration, their intended strategy use differs. Focusing on intended distributive (win-lose) strategies usage, we find that while power/status and experience negotiation research predictions suggest both partners and managers should use the strategies in the same manner, our results show accounting context specific use. We find that partners and managers intended distributive strategies use interacted with important elements of the accounting context which could not be predicted beyond the general likelihood of their existence if experience and power/status matters interacts with context. Implications for both practice and research are discussed.
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