机构控制对津巴布韦中小企业业绩的影响

N. Mashavira
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引用次数: 1

摘要

%的患者无法存活超过前3年(Mudavanhu et al. 2011)。企业绩效,尤其是中小企业的绩效,往往归因于政府支持和管理能力等因素,而忽略了其他因素,如企业中普遍存在的代理关系;然而,他们创造了一个独特的商业环境和复杂性(Kallmuenzer 2015),有可能损害业务绩效。代理关系在商业运作中无处不在,因为它是建立商业关系的基本概念(Eisenhardt 1989)。在Jensen和Meckling(1976)的开创性工作中,代理关系被定义为一个或多个个体(委托人)雇佣另一个个体(代理人)代表他们执行某些任务的合同,包括将决策权委托给代理人。代理关系也可以被理解为一种法律关系,在这种法律关系中,代理人被委托人授权代表他们履行义务,并被授权做委托人本人可以合法履行的事情(Baze 2009)。背景:机构控制已经在大型上市企业的背景下进行了研究,并与企业绩效相关联。然而,非常有限的研究证实了这种作用在中小型企业中,特别是在发展中经济体中。目的:本研究旨在建立代理控制对绩效的感知影响,以投资回报率(ROI)和创新衡量在津巴布韦哈拉雷省的中小企业。背景:对津巴布韦哈拉雷省中小企业的所有者或管理者进行了初步研究。方法:最终样本由106名中小企业业主或管理者组成。本研究为纯定量研究,采用调查设计。数据收集采用结构化问卷。结果:研究发现,最常用的控制机制是频繁的监督和与下属面对面的讨论。以投资回报率和创新衡量的代理控制与企业绩效之间存在微弱且统计上不显著的关系。结论:最好征求专家的意见,指导老板或经理如何正式建立和管理代理控制机制,以发挥它们的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The perceived impact of agency control on the performance of Zimbabwean small-to-medium enterprises
% of them fail to survive beyond the first 3 years (Mudavanhu et al. 2011). Business performance, especially amongst SMEs, is often attributed to factors such as government support and management competencies, ignoring other factors such as agency relationships prevailing in the businesses; yet, they create a unique business environment and a complexity (Kallmuenzer 2015) that has the potential to compromise business performance. Agency relationships are ubiquitous in business operations because they are a fundamental concept upon which business relationships are built (Eisenhardt 1989). Agency relationships were conceptualised in the seminal work by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a contract whereby one or more individuals (the principal) employ another individual (the agent) to execute some task on their behalf, involving the delegation of decision-making to the agent. Agency relationships can also be understood as legal relationships in which the agent is authorised by the principal to perform on their behalf and is empowered to do what the principal could lawfully perform in person (Baze 2009). Background: Agency control has been studied in the context of large public listed businesses and is linked to business performance. However, very limited studies have validated such a role in small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs), especially in a developing economy. Aim: The current study aimed at ezstablishing the perceived impact of agency control on performance, as measured by return on investment (ROI) and innovation in SMEs in Harare Province, Zimbabwe. Setting: Primary research was conducted amongst owners or managers of SMEs in Harare Province, Zimbabwe. Methods: The final sample consisted of 106 owners or managers of SMEs. The study was purely quantitative and adopted the survey design. Structured questionnaires were used for data collection. Results: The study established that the most used control mechanisms were frequent monitoring and face-to-face deliberations with subordinates. Weak and statistically insignificant relationships were found to exist between agency control and business performance measured by both ROI and innovation. Conclusion: It is best to solicit expert advice to coach owners or managers on how best agency control mechanisms could be formally instituted and managed to leverage on them.
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