精英机构的民主困境:法院与美联储的比较

John O. McGinnis
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摘要

作为自由市场秩序的两大支柱,最高法院和美联储从来没有被系统地比较过。然而,作为民主政治世界中的精英机构,它们在履行类似的职能方面面临着类似的问题,即分别维护对稳定法治和稳定货币价值的预先承诺。两者都面临着反多数主义的困难,即有时要为自己违背民意的决定辩护。作为回应,两者都将自己与规则捆绑在一起,以保留自己的自由裁量权,并防止在孤立的决策者小团体中常见的认知错误。然而,作为紧急情况下的描述性问题,两者都超越了保持共和国稳定的规则。这种比较说明了平行的困境,有时在一个机构的背景下得到承认,但在另一个机构中被否认或忽视。例如,评论人士认为,小团体决策的认知困难是美联储的一个主要问题,而这通常不被视为最高法院的问题。此外,美联储承认,它根据自己对紧急情况的评估采取不同的行动,但最高法院往往不承认在紧急情况下改变其判例。然而,像布什诉戈尔案和威卡德诉菲尔本案这样的决定,最好的解释是植根于与美联储类似的紧急判断。更透明地承认这种紧急情况的决定性,将使法院像美联储一样,更容易从非紧急情况下的先前判决中解脱出来。此外,这些实体的平行独立性不仅对其目的是必要的,而且在像我们自己这样的两极分化时代也面临类似的危险。如今,央行正在考虑是否应该采取新形式的行动主义来解决气候变化和不平等等问题。最高法院的历史表明,这种激进主义有可能破坏精英阶层的广泛支持。这种支持的丧失导致了政治运动,比如法院解散或支持美联储的结构性改革,这使得这些机构更难以保持其独立性并维持其预先承诺。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Democratic Dilemmas of Elite Institutions: Comparing the Court and the Fed
The Supreme Court and the Federal Reserve, twin pillars of the liberal market order, have never been systematically compared. Yet, as elite institutions in a democratic political world, they face parallel problems in carrying out similar functions of maintaining the precommitments to a stable rule of law and a stable value of money respectively. Both face a countermajoritarian difficulty of justifying their decisions on occasion to go against popular will. In response, both tie themselves to rules in order to cabin their own discretion and to prevent epistemic mistakes common in small groups of insulated decisions makers. Yet as a descriptive matter in emergencies both transcend rules to keep the republic steady. The comparison illuminates parallel dilemmas sometimes recognized in the context of one institution yet denied or ignored in the other. For instance, commentators appreciate the epistemic difficulty of small-group decision making as a major problem for the Fed, while this is not often seen as an issue for the Court. Moreover, the Fed admits it acts differently based on its own evaluation of an emergency, but the Court often does not acknowledge altering its jurisprudence in an emergency. Yet decisions like Bush v. Gore and Wickard v. Filburn are best explained as rooted in emergency judgments similar to the Fed’s. More transparent acknowledgment of the decisiveness of such emergent circumstances would make it easier for the Court, like the Fed, to unwind from its prior judgments in non-emergent circumstances. In addition, the parallel independence of these entities is not only necessary for their purposes but also face similar perils in a time of polarization like our own. Today, the central bank is considering whether it should engage in new forms of activism to address such problems as climate change and inequality. The Supreme Court’s history shows the substantial risk that such activism will undermine the diffuse support among elites. That loss of support leads to political movements, like court packing or favoring structural change for the Fed, that make it more difficult for such institutions to preserve their independence and sustain their precommitments.
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