双渠道供应链中以体验为中心的服务合作策略与定价策略

Li Qing-hua, Li Bo, Qian Sheng
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着电子商务的快速发展,越来越多的双渠道供应链上的制造商选择与零售商合作,由零售商负责为顾客提供体验服务。本文采用Stackelberg博弈论模型,分析了制造商和零售商为实现双方利润的共同增长而采取的搭便车行为和服务合作机制。零售商负责提供服务,制造商分担部分服务成本。给出了最优定价决策和最优服务水平,并分析了会员服务合作的利润。给出了服务合作和搭便车行为的度比。我们发现,随着搭便车程度比的增加,制造商的收益会增加,而零售商的利润会受到损害。然而,当服务合作的程度比增加时,双方的利润都会增加。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Experience-Centric Service Cooperation Strategies and Pricing Strategies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain
With the rapid development of e-commerce, more and more manufacturers in dual-channel supply chains choose to cooperate with the retailer, who becomes responsible for providing experience service to customers. In our research, we use a Stackelberg game theoretic model to analyze the free- riding scenario and the service cooperation mechanism implemented by the manufacturer and the retailer to increase both of their profits. The retailer is responsible for providing service, and the manufacturer shares a part of that service cost. We provide the optimal pricing decisions and optimal service level, and we analyze the members' profit from service cooperation. Degree ratios for the service cooperation and the free-riding behaviors between two members are presented. We find that the manufacturer benefits much more and the profit of the retailer will be hurt as the degree ratio of free riding increases. However, when the degree ratio of service cooperation increases, the profits of both members will increase.
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