主体间性的瓦解:疯狂是爱的失败(宾斯旺格)

O. Tsvetkova
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文认为爱与疯狂是人类存在的两种对立模式。本文以人类与人工智能的互动为例,从爱的现象学和宾斯旺格的此在分析的角度分析了在人类危机的背景下,疯狂和主体间性瓦解的相互影响。事实证明,一个人的完全实现是不可能与他人隔绝的,只有在与他人的关系中才有可能,这种关系的最高形式是爱。人是一个天生的“一般化的我们”的可能性,他的任务是在与“我们”的直接相遇中实现这种可能性。只有通过“我们”,此在才能达到其最充分的实现。爱被定义为人类的基本结构,是构成人类的“基本形式”,它的失败会导致疯狂。它被认为是L. Binswanger的假设,关于精神病理状态下爱的失败,与他人作为对象的感知有关,因此不可能创造“我们”作为世界上的存在,以及关于治疗的形式,包括打开“我们”的可能性。作者提出了一种假设,即意向性实现对“我们”的强制外部限制也会影响世界计划的缩小,从而导致疯狂。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Disintegration of Intersubjectivity: Madness as the Failure of Love (according to L. Binswanger)
The article considers the problem of love and madness as opposite modes of human existence. Using the example of human interaction with artificial intelligence it has been analyzed from the point of view of the phenomenology of love and Ludwig Binswanger's Dasein analysis the reciprocal influence of madness and disintegration of intersubjectivity in the context of an anthropocrisis. It has been demonstrated that the full realization of a person is impossible in isolation from others, it is possible only in relationships with others, the highest form of which is love. A human being is a born possibility of a "generalized We", his task is to realize this possibility in a direct meeting of "We". Only through "We" can Dasein achieve its fullest realization. Love is defined as the essential structure of the human, the "fundamental form" that structures the human being and its failure causes madness. It has been considered the hypothesis of L. Binswanger about the failure of love in a psychopathological state, in connection with the perception of others as objects and the consequent impossibility of creating "We" as being-in-the-world-together, and about the form of treatment, which consists in opening the possibility of "We". A hypothesis has been put forward that the forced external limitation of the realization of intentionality to "We" can also affect the narrowing of the world-project and lead to madness.
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