贸易战和选举干预。

Ryan Brutger, Stephen Chaudoin, Max Kagan
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引用次数: 4

摘要

作为对特朗普贸易战的回应,中国、欧盟和其他国家对美国的摇摆州和共和党大本营实施了政治针对性的贸易报复(PTTR)。我们认为,PTTR增加了公众对外国选举干预的担忧,并评估了这种跨党派报复的影响。我们在2020年大选前在美国进行了一项全国性的调查实验,以检验我们的预测。与有关制裁和外国支持的调查结果相反,我们发现强有力的证据表明,PTTR增加了共和党人和民主党人对选举干预的担忧。针对PTTR的党派双重标准在针对摇摆州的报复方面表现得最为强烈,而针对总统基础的报复则相对较小。总的来说,证据表明,主要不是为了影响选举的经济政策可能会被公众视为外国对选举的干预。补充信息:在线版本包含补充资料,下载地址为10.1007/s11558-022-09464-2。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Trade Wars and Election Interference.

Trade Wars and Election Interference.

Trade Wars and Election Interference.

Trade Wars and Election Interference.

In response to the Trump trade war, China, the EU, and other countries enacted politically-targeted trade retaliation (PTTR) against swing states and Republican strongholds in the United States. We argue that PTTR increases public concerns about foreign election interference and assess the effects of such retaliation across partisan affiliations. We test our predictions using a national survey experiment in the United States fielded before the 2020 election. In contrast to findings about sanctions and foreign endorsements, we find strong evidence that PTTR increases fears of election interference among both Republicans and Democrats. Partisan double standards in reaction to PTTR were strongest for retaliation targeting swing states and smaller for retaliation targeting the President's base. Overall, the evidence shows that economic policies which are not primarily intended to influence elections may nevertheless come to be viewed by the public as foreign election interference.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11558-022-09464-2.

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