市场奖励质量吗?来自印度的证据。

IF 1.5 4区 经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Zachary Wagner, Somalee Banerjee, Manoj Mohanan, Neeraj Sood
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引用次数: 5

摘要

关于低收入和中等收入国家的卫生保健有两个突出的事实;(1)私营部门发挥了重要作用;(2)提供的护理质量往往很差。尽管有这些事实,但我们对推动私营部门护理质量的因素以及患者为何向质量差的提供者寻求护理知之甚少。我们在印度进行了两项实地研究,为这个问题提供了见解。首先,我们使用离散选择实验来表明患者强烈重视技术质量。其次,我们使用标准化的患者来证明,质量更好的医疗机构不能收取更高的价格。相反,医疗服务提供者能够对患者能够观察到的质量要素收取更高的价格,这些要素对健康结果不太重要。未来的研究应探讨关于当地供应商技术质量的可获取信息是否可以将需求转移到更高质量的供应商并改善健康结果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Does the market reward quality? Evidence from India.

Does the market reward quality? Evidence from India.

There are two salient facts about health care in low and middle-income countries; (1) the private sector plays an important role and (2) the care provided is often of poor quality. Despite these facts we know little about what drives quality of care in the private sector and why patients seek care from poor quality providers. We use two field studies in India that provide insight into this issue. First, we use a discrete choice experiment to show that patients strongly value technical quality. Second, we use standardized patients to show that better quality providers are not able to charge higher prices. Instead providers are able to charge higher prices for elements of quality that the patient can observe, which are less important for health outcomes. Future research should explore whether accessible information on technical quality of local providers can shift demand to higher quality providers and improve health outcomes.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
3.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
18
期刊介绍: The focus of the International Journal of Health Economics and Management is on health care systems and on the behavior of consumers, patients, and providers of such services. The links among management, public policy, payment, and performance are core topics of the relaunched journal. The demand for health care and its cost remain central concerns. Even as medical innovation allows providers to improve the lives of their patients, questions remain about how to efficiently deliver health care services, how to pay for it, and who should pay for it. These are central questions facing innovators, providers, and payers in the public and private sectors. One key to answering these questions is to understand how people choose among alternative arrangements, either in markets or through the political process. The choices made by healthcare managers concerning the organization and production of that care are also crucial. There is an important connection between the management of a health care system and its economic performance. The primary audience for this journal will be health economists and researchers in health management, along with the larger group of health services researchers. In addition, research and policy analysis reported in the journal should be of interest to health care providers, managers and policymakers, who need to know about the pressures facing insurers and governments, with consequences for regulation and mandates. The editors of the journal encourage submissions that analyze the behavior and interaction of the actors in health care, viz. consumers, providers, insurers, and governments. Preference will be given to contributions that combine theoretical with empirical work, evaluate conflicting findings, present new information, or compare experiences between countries and jurisdictions. In addition to conventional research articles, the journal will include specific subsections for shorter concise research findings and cont ributions to management and policy that provide important descriptive data or arguments about what policies follow from research findings. The composition of the editorial board is designed to cover the range of interest among economics and management researchers.Officially cited as: Int J Health Econ ManagFrom 2001 to 2014 the journal was published as International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics. (Articles published in Vol. 1-14 officially cited as: Int J Health Care Finance Econ)
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